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In recent years, a number of corporations have adopted poli-
cies restricting the employment of women because of fetal vulnera-
bility to toxic chemicals or ionizing radiation. The scope of these
policies is influenced by the sexual composition of the work force.
When the work force is predominantly male, some employers ex-
clude all fertile women from hazardous jobs.1 When the work force
is predominantly female, some employers exclude only pregnant
women from hazardous jobs.2
Fetal vulnerability policies pose conflicts of interests, rights,
and responsibilities. Women do not want traditionally male, high-
paying jobs closed to them because they have not been sterilized.$
Pregnant women often have strong interests in continued employ-
ment. Employers have interests in not causing harm to workers'
potential offspring and in avoiding the possible tort liability associ-
ated with such harm. Women, employers, and society in general
have an interest in minimizing birth defects.
Some employers have concluded that women's interest in
working must yield to protecting the health of their unborn or
even "unconceived" children. Commentators and the United
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2 See, e.g., Judith A. Scott, Keeping Women in Their Place, in Wendy Chavkin, ed.,
Double Exposure 180-82 (1984); Jeanne Mager Stellman and Mary Sue Henifin, No Fertile
Women Need Apply, in Ruth Hubbard, ed., Biological Woman-The Convenient Myth 117,
120 (1982); Jeanne Mager Stellman, Women's Work, Women's Health 183 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Scott, Keeping Women in Their Place at 182 (cited in note 1) (fertile
women are not excluded from female-dominated jobs); Stellman, Women's Work, Women's
Health at 183 (cited in note 1); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543, 1550
n.11 (11th Cir. 1984) (pregnant x-ray technician fired by hospital that employs only women
as x-ray technicians).
s It is not certain that employers would accept evidence of sterility other than proof of
surgical sterilization. See note 39 and accompanying text below. American Cyanamid Co.
requires evidence of surgical sterilization. See note 39 below.
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States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits
have balanced these competing interests in light of Title VII's ban
on sex and pregnancy discrimination. These courts4 and most com-
mentators5 have concluded that "reasonable" policies excluding
pregnant or fertile women are permissible if there is a relevant dif-
ference between the risks associated with maternal and paternal
exposure. This article challenges this generally accepted view.
At first glance, most people presented with this issue (myself
included) assume that "reasonable" restrictions on maternal em-
ployment must be appropriate in some circumstances for the pro-
tection of fetuses. From the beginning of this project, however, I
thought it odd that Title VII would prohibit state legislation "pro-
tecting" only women workers, while allowing private employers to
adopt policies protecting potential offspring from the risks associ-
ated only with maternal employment.
When I explored the issue in greater depth, I was surprised by
the similarities between the contemporary debate over fetal vul-
nerability policies and the earlier debate over sex-specific protec-
tionist legislation. Despite the enactment of Title VII, little seems
to have changed when the question is whether to limit women's
Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543; Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
5 Consider, e.g., Shelley Reed Logan, Adapting Fetal Vulnerability Programs to Title
VII: Wright v. Olin, 9 Employee Rel. L. J. 605 (1984); Lois Vanderwaerdt, Resolving the
Conflict Between Hazardous Substances in the Workplace and Equal Employment Opportu-
nity, 21 Amer. Bus. L. J. 157 (1983); Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the
Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under
Title VII, 69 Ga. L. Rev. 641 (1981); Gary Z. Northstein and Jeffrey P. Ayres, Sex-Based
Considerations of Differentiation in the Workplace: Exploring the Biomedical Interface Be-
tween OSHA and Title VII, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 239 (1981); Hannah Artenan Furnish, Prenatal
Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy
Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 63 (1980); Donald
R. Crowell II and David A. Copus, Safety and Equality at Odds: OSHA and Title VII Clash
over Health Hazards in the Workplace, 2 Ind. Rel. L. J. 567 (1978); Note, Exclusionary
Employment Practices in Hazardous Industries: Protection or Discrimination?, 5 Colum. J.
Envtl. L. 97 (1978).
A few commentators have construed Title VII strictly, relying on language in cases in-
terpreting the BFOQ defense in other settings. These commentators conclude that some or
all sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies violate Title VII. See, e.g., Patricia A. Timko, Ex-
ploring the Limits of Legal Duty. A Union's Responsibilities with Respect to Fetal Protec-
tion Policies, 23 Harv. J. Legis. 159 (1986); Vibinia M. Andrade, The Toxic Workplace: Title
VII Protection for the Potentially Pregnant Person, 4 Harv. Women's L. J. 71 (1981); Note,
Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 Cal. L. Rev. 1113 (1977).
1 A similar approach was taken by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, and the Department of Labor in proposed, and
subsequently withdrawn, guidelines. See Proposed Interpretive Guidelines on Employment
Discrimination and Reproduction Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (Feb. 1, 1980), as corrected, 45




employment opportunities for the good of their potential children.
In both debates, for example, proponents of sex-specific policies
assert as uncontroversial that women's interests should give way to
the interests of the next generation. I was also surprised by the
unusual Title VII analysis used by courts to hold that sex-specific
policies do not necessarily violate Title VII.
In this article, I examine the proponents' justifications for fe-
tal vulnerability policies and the legality of the policies under Title
VII.7 I begin by offering a critical perspective on proponents' argu-
ments because one's view of the legality of sex-specific fetal vulner-
ability policies under Title VII seems to depend on whether one
accepts these arguments as compelling. When judges construe stat-
utes in bizarre ways, they likely do so for a purpose: to reach a
result they consider expedient. I therefore begin section I with an
examination of the arguments that were once advanced to support
sex-specific labor legislation and compare these arguments to the
arguments advanced today to support sex-specific fetal vulnerabil-
ity policies. I point out many troubling similarities between the
two debates, similarities that counsel against a casual acceptance
of sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies.
In section II, I consider the legality of sex-specific fetal vulner-
ability policies and conclude that they violate Title VII. Sex-spe-
cific policies should be held impermissible in the absence of further
congressional action. In section III, I discuss why, if sex-specific
policies are ever needed, Congress would be a better decision
maker than individual employers, even with judicial review of em-
ployer decisions for "reasonableness."
I. THE REALITY OF DISCRIMINATION
A. The Arguments for Sex-Specific Protectionist Legislation
During the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early
decades of this century, most state legislatures adopted legislation
"protecting" women workers and hence the next generation of chil-
7 I assume throughout that our society has accepted as a norm a ban on sex discrimina-
tion in employment. Whether such a norm is appropriate or desirable is a matter beyond
the scope of this paper. For a strong defense of freedom to contract in employment, consider
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 (1984). For
other discussions of such issues, see, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel and Edward P. Lazear, Compa-
rable Worth and Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 891 (1986); Mary E.
Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for Additional
Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 934 (1986); James D. Holz-
hauer, The Economic Possibilities of Comparable Worth, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 919 (1986).
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dren.8 These statutes took a number of forms. Many limited the
number of hours women could work or the number of days women
could work in a row. Some required that women be given time for
rest periods and lunch. Others prohibited the employment of
women in certain industries and occupations or limited women to
daytime work.9
Whether in the aggregate sex-specific protectionist legislation
helped or hurt women is probably unknowable.' 0 Today, however,
much of the reasoning and rhetoric supporting sex-specific protec-
tionist legislation sounds sexist."
Consider, for example, the case of Muller v. Oregon.'2 In
Muller, the Supreme Court upheld an Oregon statute that prohib-
ited the employment of any woman for more than ten hours a day
"in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry in this
State."' 3 Three years earlier in Lochner v. New York,' 4 the Court
had held unconstitutional a similar statute, covering both male and
female workers. But, in Muller, Chief Justice Brewer explained
that a statute restricting only the employment of women was per-
missible because "healthy mothers are essential to vigorous off-
spring, [and] the physical well-being of woman becomes an object
of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and
vigor of the race."' 5 In upholding the legislation, the Court noted
that the restrictions were not imposed solely for her benefit, but
"also largely for the benefit of all."' 6 The Court did not discuss the
economic consequences of the statute for women who might need
8 See Florence P. Smith, Chronological Development of Labor Legislation for Women
in the United States, United States Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin No.
66-HI at 137-285 (rev. ed. 1932) (providing a state by state chronological history).
9 Id.
10 Although some women opposed special legislation for women, many of those who
supported such legislation were women and men sympathetic to the needs of working
women. Such legislation could, and sometimes did, improve the options available to working
women. See Clara M. Beyer, History of Labor Legislation for Women in Three States,
United States Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin No. 66 at 17 (1929).
11 This discussion of sex-specific protectionist legislation is narrow and ignores many
fascinating and complex aspects of the era, the debate, the effects, and so on. For fuller
discussions, see Judith A. Baer, The Chains of Protection 14-106 (1978); Deborah L. Rhode,
Feminist Theory and Legal Thought ch. 5 (forthcoming); Kathryn Kish Sklar, Hull House
in the 1890s: A Community of Woman Reformers, 10 Signs 658 (1985); Note, Constitutional
Law-Regulation of Conditions of Employment of Women: A Critique of Muller v. Oregon,
13 Bost. U. L. Rev. 276 (1933).
12 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
13 Id. at 416-17.
" 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15 208 U.S. at 421.
,6 Id. at 422.
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night work, but it did note that "woman has always been depen-
dent upon man. "17
The Brandeis brief filed in the New York case of People v.
Charles Schweinler Press18 details the arguments for limiting the
employment of women. At issue was a New York statute forbid-
ding the employment of women for night shift work in factories
and laundries. The brief describes problems associated with "dep-
rivation of sunlight,"19 the difficulty of getting adequate rest dur-
ing the day,20 high morbidity and mortality among night workers, 2
the dangers of returning home at night,2 2 the moral dangers associ-
ated with night work,23 and the difficulty of combining motherhood
and domestic responsibilities with night work.24 Most of the
problems discussed in the brief affected male as well as female
workers; indeed, much of the specific evidence cited by Brandeis
described male workers.25 Moreover, the brief included evidence
that night work had detrimental effects on the families of male
workers 26 and on male reproductive capacity.27 In addition, the
17 Id. at 421. Women's natural dependency was the basis on which the Court distin-
guished Lochner: even if "she stood, so far as statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely
equal plane with him, it would still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon
and look to him for protection." Id. at 422.
I" 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E. 639 (1915).
"9 A Summary of "Facts of Knowledge" Submitted on Behalf of the People in Support
of its Brief, People of the State of New York v. Charles Schweinler Press 97-111 (prepared
by Louis D. Brandeis and Josephine Goldmark) ("Facts of Knowledge").
20 Id. at 54-96.
21 Id. at 111-55.
23 Id. at 252-60.
23 Id. at 226-52 (night work causes exhaustion, which leads to drinking, and the close
association of men and women at night leads to sexual temptation).
2' Id. at 121, 125, 138-39, 141, 174-97, 213-26.
20 See, e.g., id. at 112-13, 124-27, 134, 147-49, 151, 153-54 (male night workers experi-
ence high morbidity and mortality); id. at 56, 58-59, 60-63, 64, 71 (male night shift workers
have difficulty getting adequate sleep). According to one report summarized in the Facts of
Knowledge, married women who worked at night slept an average of only four and one half
hours a day; another report described male workers who "fitfully" slept only two or three
hours. Id. at 56.
26 See id. at 219 ("real home life" impossible for male night workers), 223-24 (families
of male night workers suffer severely), 232-33 (men who work at night sleep and drink dur-
ing the day; night work brutalizes the male worker, who often is driven to intemperance and
stops working).
In the brief filed by the defendant in error in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917)
(challenging a ten-hour work day law applicable to men and women), Frankfurter and Bran-
deis present additional evidence that exhausted male workers are unlikely to have the en-
ergy necessary for a good family life. The Case for the Shorter Work Day, Brief for Defend-
ant in Error in Bunting v. Oregon 452-70, printed in U.S. Supreme Court Briefs and
Records, 243 U.S. 426-443 (submitted by Felix Frankfurter and Josephine Goldmark, pre-
pared in part by Louis D. Brandeis) ("The Case for the Shorter Work Day").
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problems associated with women's work at night-such as the dan-
ger of walking home-were as likely to arise when women worked
in occupations from which they were not excluded by legislation.
Thus, the problems assertedly addressed by the legislation
were peculiar neither to women nor to factory and laundry work at
night. At bottom, the argument for the limitation was based, not
on empirical evidence of special hazards for women and their fami-
lies, but on general assertions that factory and laundry work was
difficult, that night shift work was especially taxing, that women
were weaker than men, and that the strength of women should be
protected for the future of the race.28 Brandeis asserted, without
discussion, that the state was justified in resolving any conflict be-
tween women's interest in wage work and society's interest in the
domestic and reproductive responsibilities of women in favor of
the latter.29
The brief does not discuss why women might not be able to
make competent decisions about night work in factories and laun-
dries, weighing their actual alternatives in light of their needs and
the needs of their dependents. On this point, the brief merely
quotes a New York Factory Investigative Commission's conclusion
that "only a few of the women seemed to realize that this combina-
tion [of night work and family responsibilities] might prove disas-
trous. . . . Ignorant women can scarcely be expected to realize the
dangers not only to their own health but to that of the next gener-
ation from such inhuman usage.""
Several aspects of these arguments are troubling. First, sup-
porters of sex-specific labor legislation did not consider the alter-
natives available to working women and the effects of those alter-
natives on the workers and their families. Women were seen as
uniformly dependent on men, and women's financial contributions
to their families as less important than their biologic and domestic
contributions. Second, women were not regarded as individu-
als-who might not have domestic responsibilities for others or
" The Facts of Knowledge asserts that male night workers were likely to drink to re-
lieve their fatigue. See Facts of Knowledge at 232-33, 241, 244-46 (cited in note 19). As one
commentator has noted, "[n]either fatigue nor alcohol separately, let alone in combination,
is a stimulus to 'procreative power,' as authorities as diverse as Shakespeare and Dr. David
Rubin have pointed out." Baer, The Chains of Protection at 79-80 (cited in note 11).
The brief also contains a physican's statement that "[tihe procreative power of men is
diminished or impaired" by nightwork, and a statement by a miner that after a month of
night work, he was "only half a man." Facts of Knowledge at 155, 124.
28 Facts of Knowledge at 8, 490.
29 Id. at 483, 490.
30 Id. at 175-76.
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even the capacity to reproduce-or as having any autonomous in-
terests apart from their families' interests. Instead, all women were
seen only in terms of the biologic and domestic responsibilities as-
sociated with motherhood."1 Third, proponents were willing to
place restrictions on women without firm scientific evidence of any
need for the restrictions. Fourth, women were excluded only when
they were dispensable. No state passed a statute banning all night
work for women because of the dangers of walking home at night.
Women were too important as hospital workers, for example, to
merit such broad "protection. 3 2 Fifth, supporters dismissed out of
hand the possibility that women might be competent decision
makers.
In short, the exclusion of women from certain employment op-
portunities depended on the perception that wage work by women
was marginal in every sense. It was of marginal importance to the
woman and her family (whose primary supporter would naturally
be a husband and father) and of marginal importance to industry
and to society.
Today, state protective legislation no longer is enforceable.
Since 1969, courts have uniformly held that sex-specific state labor
statutes are preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which bans discrimination in employment on the basis of sex
or pregnancy.33 Courts have been more tolerant of policies adopted
by employers, restricting the opportunities of fertile or pregnant
women, to protect the future of the race. Yet troubling aspects of
the earlier debate reappear in the contemporary controversy.
B. The Similar Arguments for Sex-Specific Fetal Vulnerability
Policies
During the 1970s, employers were under considerable pressure
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Of-
fice of Federal Contract Compliance to admit women into tradi-
tionally male, unionized, blue-collar jobs. As women began to move
S In contrast, in arguing for limits on the number of hours men could work, Brandeis
and Frankfurter stressed that shorter days were necessary to afford male workers "opportu-
nities for self-improvement or legitimate enjoyment." See The Case for the Shorter Work
Day at 499-531 (cited in note 26).
32 See Stellman, Women's Work at 176-77 (cited in note 1).
31 See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Manning
v. General Motors Corp., 3 Fair Empl. Pract. Cases 968 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aft'd, 466 F.2d 812
(6th Cir. 1972); Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971), rev'd
on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972); Baer, The Chains of Protection at 167 (cited
in note 11).
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into such jobs in significant numbers for the first time, a number of
companies adopted very restrictive fetal vulnerability policies.
Among the companies were Olin, American Cyanamid, Allied
Chemical, B.F. Goodrich, Monsanto, Sun Oil, Gulf Oil, Union Car-
bide, General Motors, Delco-Remy, St. Joe's Minerals, Bunker
Hill, and ASARCO. Their policies exclude all fertile women from
traditionally male jobs involving "excessive" exposure to a number
of chemicals, including lead, benzene, vinyl chloride, carbon tetra-
chloride, carbon monoxide, mercury, and carbon disulfide.3 4 In or-
der to preserve their jobs, at least five women at American Cyana-
mid chose to be sterilized.3 5
In 1979, the number of jobs from which fertile women were
excluded because of these policies was conservatively estimated at
100,000 and upwards.5 8 Since then, such policies have become more
common, 3 but current estimates of the number of jobs they cover
are not available. The number of jobs involving exposure to such
chemicals, and from which women could be excluded were such
policies more generally adopted, is much higher, perhaps as high as
twenty million. 8
The Olin Corporation's fetal vulnerability policy is typical of
See Scott, Keeping Women in Their Place at 180 (cited in note 1); Williams, 69 Ga.
L. Rev. at 648 (cited in note 5); Margaret Seminario, Women Workers: Hazards on the Job,
AFL-CIO American Federationist 18, 22 (Aug. 1978).
35 Office of Technology Assessment, Reproductive Health Hazards in the Workplace
184 (1985) ("Reproductive Health Hazards"). Several months after these sterilizations, the
restricted departments were closed for other reasons. See Scott, Keeping Women in Their
Place at 180 (cited in note 1).
"' Williams, 69 Ga. L. Rev. at 647 n.29 (cited in note 5). "[A]t least 15 of the Fortune
500 as well as numerous hospitals" have sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies. Reproduc-
tive Health Hazards at 235 (cited in note 35).
The number of jobs from which women are effectively barred is significantly higher
than the number of jobs from which women are formally excluded. Often, jobs from which
women are excluded are part of a line of progression under a union contract. In Olin, for
example, only twelve of 265 jobs were closed to all fertile women. But "[a]t least five of the
eleven lines of progression in the film division [were] affected by the policy." 697 F.2d at
1182. Without experience in the restricted job, a woman cannot advance to higher jobs in
the line of progression, even though those jobs might not be formally closed to her.
Sometimes, the effect of an exclusionary policy limiting exposure to certain chemicals is
to effectively deny any employment to fertile women at a certain plant. For example, be-
cause lead is present throughout GM's battery plants, the company's policy "virtually fore-
closes the employment of women altogether." Scott, Keeping Women in Their Place at 181
(cited in note 1).
37 See Reproductive Health Hazards at 244 (cited in note 35).
3 See Interpretive Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. at 7514 (cited in note 6). Many of these
jobs are, however, traditionally female jobs. As discussed elsewhere, policies excluding all
fertile women have not been adopted (and are not likely to be adopted in the future) when
jobs are held by significant numbers of women. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 90-104
below.
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the policies excluding all fertile women from predominantly male
jobs. Under the Olin policy, adopted in 1978, no woman between
the ages of 5 and 63 can work in certain "restricted" jobs unless a
medical doctor "confirms" that she cannot become pregnant.39 Re-
stricted jobs involve exposure at or above certain levels40 to chemi-
cals "known [to cause] or suspected" of causing miscarriages or
birth defects.4'
Some employers have restricted the employment opportunities
of pregnant women holding women's jobs to protect fetal health.
For example, Shelby Memorial Hospital adopted a policy under
which pregnant x-ray technicians were fired.4 2 There are no avail-
able estimates of the number of jobs from which pregnant women
are excluded.
Employers adopting sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies ar-
gue that conservative policies are necessary to "'avoid even the re-
mote chance that [women] would receive close to the permissible
level [of exposure] to the fetus.' ,,4 Employers urge that a good
faith belief that a policy promotes fetal health should insulate an
employer from liability for sex or pregnancy discrimination under
3" 697 F.2d at 1182. It is not clear what kind of evidence would "confirm" that a wo-
man between these ages cannot become pregnant. At American Cyanamid, any woman be-
tween the ages of 16 and 50 was deemed "to be of childbearing capacity unless she
presented proof that she had been surgically sterilized." Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers
v. American Cyanamid Co., 741 F.2d 444, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
40 According to American Cyanamid's medical director, Olin set fertile-female exposure
limits for various chemicals at one-half the present adult exposure limits on the basis of
"educated guessing." See letter dated Dec. 13, 1977 from Robert M. Clyne, Corporate Medi-
cal Director, American Cyanamid Co., to J. Cassutot, M.D., General Medical Director, West-
ern Electric Co. ("Clyne Letter"), reprinted in part in the Reply Brief of the American Civil
Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, et al. at 17 n.25 ("Olin ACLU Brief"), also re-
printed in part in Reproductive Health Hazards at 255 (cited in note 35). American Cyana-
mid used an "ultraconservative" approach and "educated guessing" in setting the fertile-
female exposure limits at even smaller fractions of present adult exposure limits. See Repro-
ductive Health Hazards at 255.
41 697 F.2d at 1182 (emphasis added). Some jobs involving more limited exposure to
such agents are classified as "controlled." Fertile but nonpregnant women are allowed to
hold controlled jobs, but decisions about the continued employment of pregnant women in
these jobs are made on a case by case basis. Id.
42 Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1543. See also Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986
(5th Cir. 1982) (pregnant x-ray technician fired). According to the brief of Shelby Memorial
Hospital on appeal in Hayes, "[i]n other hospitals, pregnant technicians are asked [sic] to
resign as a matter of hospital policy." Brief of Appellant Shelby Memorial Hospital at 10
("Shelby Hospital Brief"). The University of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham has adopted
a less restrictive policy, limiting the exposure of pregnant technicians to radiation but not
firing them. Id. at 10-11.
,1 Shelby Hospital Brief at 12 (quoting expert testimony about policy at another hospi-
tal). See also Clyne Letter (cited in note 40).
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Title VII.44
In part, employers justify this standard by reference to their
potential tort liability for injury to the children of women workers.
Because Title VII does not allow differential treatment of women
on the basis of financial considerations, employers also argue that
they have a moral, humanitarian duty to avoid injuring the next
generation.45 Employers regard the unconceived or unborn child as
a member of the public who has no interest in its mother's contin-
ued employment. The Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers
Association put it this way: "Since the fetus derives no primary
benefit from its unknown or known presence in the workplace, it
should not be exposed to excessive risks. ' 46 Employers have casu-
ally asserted as uncontroversial that the interests of the potential
fetus rank "above those of the mother/worker,"' 47 and that limited
employment opportunity for women "is a small price for mothers,
potential mothers, and society to pay."48
Two additional arguments are advanced to support the exclu-
sion of all fertile women from certain jobs. First, although the risk
of fetal damage (other than early spontaneous abortion, which the
mother may not even notice) is low at the very beginning of preg-
nancy, a fetus might be exposed beyond that period before the
mother knows that she is pregnant.49 Second, some chemicals (the
44 See, e.g., Brief for Appellee Olin Corp. at 22-25 ("Olin Brief") (arguing that a fetal
vulnerability policy excluding fertile women is permissible if the employer has a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the policy, such as concern for fetal safety). See also Shelby
Hospital Brief at 24-26 (same).
Employers argue that their good faith belief that maternal exposure poses risks to fe-
tuses should be sufficient to impose on fertile women all the costs of protecting these poten-
tial third parties. Employers have argued successfully for a quite different standard when
OSHA has sought to impose the costs of an existing third party's (worker's) safety on em-
ployers. In Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), employers
argued that the cost of worker safety could be imposed on employers only when there is real
evidence of health risks, not simply when OSHA, in good faith, believes that (scientifically
unproven) risks exist. The Court agreed.
45 See Shelby Hospital Brief at 5; Olin Brief at 22-25; Ronald Bayer, Reproductive
Hazards in the Workplace: Bearing the Burden of Fetal Risk, 60 Health & Society 633, 644
(1982) (describing industry comments on proposed, and withdrawn, EEOC-OFCC-DOL
guidelines on fetal vulnerability policies (cited in note 5)).
46 Bayer, 60 Health & Society at 644 (cited in note 45) (quoting the Synthetic Organic
Chemical Manufacturers Association).
41 Id. at 644 (quoting the Equal Empoyment Opportunity Advisory Council's com-
ments filed on EEOC-OFCC-DOL proposed guidelines on fetal vulnerability policies).
,1 Id. at 644 (quoting the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association).
I Amicus Curiae Brief filed on behalf of Olin by the Equal Employment Advisory
Council, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Lead Industries Association, Inc., and
American Cyanamid Co. at 41-43 ("Olin Industry Brief"). Employers have not argued that
sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies are justified by the risk of early spontaneous abor-
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most common example being lead) are retained by the body for
considerable periods of time, so that exposure prior to pregnancy
may cause fetal harm even though no exposure occurs during
pregnancy.50
Each of the troubling aspects of sex-specific protectionist leg-
islation recurs in the contemporary debate over fetal vulnerability
policies: the refusal to consider the effects of policies on women,
the identification of women with (and only with) reproductive
functions, the willingness to limit women's employment opportuni-
ties without evidence that women's employment poses real risks to
others, the exclusion only of women perceived as marginal workers,
and the assumption that women are not competent decision
makers.
1. Actual alternatives. The economic impact of fetal vulnera-
bility policies on individual women and their dependents can be
severe. When a pregnant worker is fired to ensure fetal safety, the
result may be unemployment and loss of employment-related ben-
efits. Other policies exclude fertile women from traditionally male
blue-collar jobs,51 and these positions tend to pay more than many
traditionally female jobs.52 Unless a woman is willing to be steril-
ized, she may be effectively excluded for life.53 With an ever-
greater proportion of households headed by women and with an
increasing proportion of these households in poverty,5 4 entry into
traditionally male, high-paying positions is important to women
tions. Employer liability for such incidents would be limited; the female worker would usu-
ally be able to seek (at most) medical expenses and disability benefits for any period of
temporary disability under the applicable workers' compensation system. In addition, the
combination of Title VII and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), would make it difficult to
justify exclusionary policies based on such risks.
80 Olin Industry Brief at 20-21, 43 (cited in note 49).
5' See Williams, 69 Ga. L. Rev. at 649 (cited in note 5).
" According to 1983 data, women working full time for wages earn, on the average, 62
percent as much as men working full time for wages. Rita Ricardo-Campbell, Women and
Comparable Worth 1 (1985). This represents an increase from the 59 percent figure for ear-
lier years. Id.
13 It would be difficult for a middle-aged woman to break into a traditionally male
blue-collar job for which she has no experience.
" Between 1960 and 1980, the percentage of female-headed families rose from 9.2 per-
cent to 13.9 percent. During that period, the percentage of families below the poverty line
that were female-headed rose from 21.3 percent to 43.8 percent. The number (and propor-
tion) of poor female-headed families rose sharply while the number (and proportion) of poor
families declined sharply. See I 1980 Census of Population, Chapter C, General Social and
Economic Characteristics, Part 1, United States Summary PC 80-1-Cl, Table 96 (1983).
Divorced women with custody of their children (even if above the official poverty line),
often have difficulty supporting themselves and their children on women's wages. For gen-
eral discussion, see Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (1985).
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and their dependents.
Yet, as in the earlier debate over sex-specific protectionist leg-
islation, proponents advocate limits on maternal employment with-
out considering the alternatives actually open to the excluded
women and the negative effects of those alternatives on the work-
ers and their families. In Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, for
example, the hospital medical director recommended firing a preg-
nant x-ray technician to protect fetal health, without regard to the
financial effect his decision would have on the pregnant woman
and her child. Alternative employment would be difficult for a
pregnant woman to find. Hayes may have lost both her only source
of income and her health insurance. Good medical care during
pregnancy and at childbirth is especially important from the
child's point of view; Hayes's child thus might have faced higher
risks as a result of maternal unemployment than it would have
faced had Hayes continued to work. 5 The medical director did not
know Hayes personally and knew little about her other than that
she was pregnant. 56 He fired her because he considered any expo-
sure of a pregnant woman to ionizing radiation "excessive." 5 Thus,
he assumed that every pregnant woman's reproductive role is more
important than her economic role.
Similar points can be made when all fertile women are ex-
cluded from an employer's work force. A fertile woman excluded
from a traditionally male job may take another job that is as dan-
gerous to her potential children but pays lower wages because it is
dominated by female workers.58 Mother and children may receive
85 See David Rush, Socioeconomic Status and Perinatal Outcome, in Silvio Aladjem
and Audrey K. Brown, eds., Prenatal Intensive Care 14, 14-17 (1977) (discussing, among
other things, striking relationship between changes in the unemployment rate and changes
in infant mortality rate).
"See Shelby Hospital Brief at 13 (cited in note 42).
57 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 11 ("Hayes Plaintiff Brief") (quoting trial testi-
mony of medical director, who also considered "excessive" a sunbath by a pregnant woman
in a bikini).
"For example, Vicky Read was fired from a $4.70 per hour job with St Joe's Mineral,
a job involving exposure to lead. At her prior job, working for a hospital for the elderly
(where exposure to viral infections would threaten the outcome of pregnancy), she had
earned $2.50 an hour. Vicky Read was twenty-two years old and the sole supporter of a
young child and a husband, blind in one eye, who was having trouble finding employment.
The company adopted a fetal vulnerability policy, and though Read had no intention of
getting pregnant (because she could not afford it even at the higher pay of the dangerous
job), she was given the choice of being sterilized or transferring to janitorial and yard work
at reduced pay. Dorothy McGhee, Workplace Hazards: No Women Need Apply, The Pro-
gressive 20 (Oct. 1977). •
Read reported: "I couldn't decide how we were going to afford to live, really. Jobs just
aren't that easy to find around here. We have an 8 per cent unemployment rate in Pennsyl-
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worse health care than they would receive were the mother em-
ployed in a more dangerous job with better medical insurance.
There are countless other ways in which fetal vulnerability
policies may make women and their children worse off in terms of
health. 9 A woman earning a higher wage may be less likely to live
in an old, poorly maintained apartment in which her children are
exposed to lead paint. Both the woman and her children are more
likely to suffer malnutrition if she does not have a well-paying
job.60 For a pregnant woman, commuting by public transportation
may be more hazardous to the fetus than commuting by car;6' a
woman with a higher-paying job is more likely to be able to afford
a car. Excessive heat can have detrimental effects on pregnancy,
and a mother in a higher paying job is more likely to be able to
afford air conditioning.2
In addition, fetal vulnerability policies perpetuate existing
patterns of job segregation, the common explanation for a substan-
tial part of the male-female wage gap. For the woman's living and
potential female children, the continued segregation of women in
women's jobs may not be a matter of indifference.
2. Perception of women. In the earlier debate, women were
not seen as individuals in a variety of situations or as having au-
vania. It's bad, really bad. I was hurt. I worked hard in that plant to show that I could do
it." Id. at 21.
59 See, e.g., Sanford Meyerowitz and Mack Lipkin, Jr., Psychosocial Aspects, in Robert
L. Brent and Maureen I. Harris, eds., 3 Prevention of Embryonic, Fetal, and Perinatal Dis-
ease 263, 267 (1976) (discussing correlation between "[a]dverse economic, social and family
circumstances for the pregnant woman" and "pregnancy complications, prematurity, low
birth weight and subsequent developmental problems for their infants"); R. A. Chez, D.
Haire, E. J. Quilligan, and M. B. Wingate, High-Risk Pregnancies: Obstetrical and Perinatal
Factors, in Brent and Harris, eds., 3 Prevention of Disease at 70-72 (discussing correlations
between socioeconomic status and successful pregnancies, and between health care and suc-
cessful pregnancies).
60 See Joel Greenberg, Unstable Emotions of Children Tied to Poor Diet, N.Y. Times
p. C1 (Aug. 18, 1981).
01 See American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Guidelines on Pregnancy
and Work 8 (NIOSH Publication No. 78-118) (1977) ("Pregnancy Guidelines").
62 There may be other negative effects if the excluded woman takes a traditionally fe-
male job. For example, one epidemiological study of heart disease reveals that women work-
ing as clerical workers are at greater risk of coronary heart disease than other women. The
differential is higher for female clerical workers with children, and higher still for female
clerical workers with children married to blue-collar men. See generally Suzanne G. Haynes,
Elaine D. Eaker, and Manning Feinleib, The Effect of Employment, Family, and Job Stress
on Coronary Heart Disease Patterns in Women, in Ellen B. Gold, ed., The Changing Risk of
Disease in Women 37, 39 (1984).
The psychological effects (on the woman and her family) of excluding a woman from a
higher-paying job may also be significant. Consider the testimony of Vicky Read, cited in
note 58 above.
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tonomous interests and potential apart from those of their fami-
lies. Women were seen only in terms of the reproductive and do-
mestic functions associated with motherhood.63 Similarly, in the
contemporary debate, women are viewed solely in terms of repro-
ductive functions. 4
In arguing for sex-specific fetal vulnerabilty policies, employ-
ers seem to concede that women may have interests in working de-
spite fetal vulnerability: otherwise, there would be no need for ex-
clusionary policies. But women's separate interests are effectively
ignored. Employers' associations have asserted as uncontroversial
that any independent interests women have should yield to the in-
terest of the fetus or potential fetus66 When employers with this
attitude exclude all fertile women from the workplace, it is as if
they are stating that women's interests in employment are so weak
that they are easily trumped by the interests of beings who may
never exist.66
By viewing women in terms of their group's reproductive func-
tion, proponents of fetal vulnerability policies fail to treat women
as individuals. Policies that apply to all fertile women (with the
presumption of fertility for all women 5 to 63 at Olin, for exam-
ple67 ) assume that the probability that any given fertile woman will
become pregnant in the future is sufficiently high to justify exclud-
ing her from a job for which she is qualified. Yet the probability of
having a child varies a great deal among individual women, de-
pending on family situation, age, number of existing children, birth
control method being used, attitudes toward abortion, and a host
of other factors. Any of these factors, or a combination thereof,
may make it extremely unlikely that a particular woman will have
a child. For example, only one out of 5,000 women aged 45 to 49
63 Feminist psychoanalytic theory explains that, because our early primary caretakers
were mothers, we have difficulty perceiving mother and child (or potential child) as separate
beings. We idealize mothers and are unable to disentangle the interests of mother and child.
See Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering 81 (1978). Chodorow notes that "so-
cial commentators, legislators, and most clinicians expect women's interests to enhance their
mothering and expect women to want only interests that do so." Id. at 82.
' Similar comparisons could be drawn between the abortion debate and the debates
discussed in this article. For example, activists' positions on abortion tend to be related to
their views on the role of women. For general discussion, see Kristin Luker, Abortion and
the Politics of Motherhood (1984).
"' See text at notes 40-48 above.
" The assertions in text at notes 46-48 above were offered by employers arguing for
policies excluding all fertile women.
67 Olin, 697 F.2d at 1182. At American Cynamid, the "fetal protection policy" excluded
all women between 16 and 50 unless a woman "presented proof that she had been surgically
sterilized." 741 F.2d at 446.
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has a child in any given year.6 8 For blue-collar women over 30, the
birth rate may be less than 2 percent.69 When fetal vulnerability
policies nevertheless apply to all fertile women, the fact that a par-
ticular woman is unlikely to have children is ignored.
Except for a few chemicals that are retained in the body for
extended periods of time (lead is the most common example), 70
employers concerned about fetal vulnerability could exclude only
pregnant women. Experts agree that harm to the fetus (other than
early spontaneous abortion) is not likely during the first three
weeks of pregnancy. 7' Blood tests are available that can reveal
pregnancy in the first eight days. 2 Rather than excluding all fertile
women from jobs involving chemicals that are not retaineds em-
63 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1986 at 57 (1985) (1983 rates). The birth rate drops to near zero at age 40.
There is only a 0.38 percent probability that a woman employee between 40 and 44 will have
a child in any given year. For a woman between 45 and 49, there is only a 0.02 percent
chance of a birth during any given year. Although the Olin presumption of fertility lasts
until 63, the census does not even record birth rates for women 50 and older.
:0 See Stellman and Henifin, No Fertile Women Need Apply at 138 (cited in note 1).
70 See Olin Industry Brief at 5 (cited in note 49).
Both lead and mercury are retained in the body for a significant period after exposure.
See, e.g., Leonard J. Goldwater, Antonio Nicolau, and S. Joao Da Madeira, Absorption and
Excretion of Mercury in Man, 12 Arch. Environ. Health 196 (1966) (mercury nitrate); Na-
tional Research Council Committee on Lead in the Human Environment 59 (1980) (lead).
Almost all lead retained outside bones is, however, eliminated from the body within four to
six weeks of exposure. See Lead in the Human Environment at 59-60. Lead stored in bones,
especially lead-207 (a common form of lead), is relatively inactive biologically. National Re-
search Council Committee on Biologic Effects of Atmospheric Pollutants 68 (1972).
Also, though children are very sensitive to lead, there is evidence of an effective placen-
tal barrier to its passage. Huel, Everson, and Menger, Increased Hair Cadmum in Newborns
of Women Occupationally Exposed to Heavy Metals, 35 Environ. Res. 115, 119-120 (1984)
(noting also, however, evidence of an association between maternal exposure to lead and
premature birth).
71 See, e.g., Richard L. Naeye and Nebiat Tafari, Risk Factors in Pregnancy and Dis-
eases of the Fetus and Newborn 7-8 (1983); Ian C.T. Nisbet and Nathan J. Karch, Chemical
Hazards to Human Reproduction 16 (1983).
71 See Robert Landesman and Brij. B. Saxena, Results of the First 1000 Radi-
oreceptorassays for the Determination of Human Chorionic Gonadotropin: A New, Rapid,
Reliable, and Sensitive Pregnancy Test, 27 Fertility & Sterility 357 (1976) (noting that the
test takes one hour and reveals pregnancy one week after conception); Pedro A. Poma, Early
Detection of Pregnancy, 76 J. Nat'l Med. Assoc. 305, 309 (1984) (noting that the test is
"easy, fast, . . . and economic").
This blood test is routinely used in many hospitals and clinics for early, accurate detec-
tion of pregnancy. See, e.g., Wampole Laboratories, In Routine Diagnosis of Pregnancy Bi-
ocept-G (manufacturer's brochure on file with The University of Chicago Law Review);
METPATH, Laboratory Update Human Chorionic Gonadotropin (clinic's internal memo
annoucing adoption of the test for routine testing effective April 21, 1986) (on file with The
University of Chicago Law Review).
73 Of the chemicals listed above in text at note 34, only lead and mercury are retained
in the body for any significant period of time. See note 70 above.
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ployers could give pregnancy tests on a regular basis. Policies ex-
cluding all fertile women to prevent exposure to rapidly eliminated
substances unnecessarily treat fertile women as perpetually
pregnant.
Employers have responded that pregnancy tests would be in-
trusive and would "raise[] invasion of privacy questions." 4 But
current policies require a woman to choose between ever having
another child and proving sterility to obtain a desired job. Offering
a woman a third, additional choice-taking the desired job and un-
dergoing routine pregnancy testing-would not be more intrusive
on her reproductive freedom or a greater invasion of her privacy. 5
The point here is not that pregnancy testing is the ideal solution
for rapidly eliminated substances or permissible under Title VII.76
The point is only that employers have offered no satisfactory justi-
fication for treating all fertile women as perpetually pregnant when
the issue is exposure to rapidly-eliminated chemicals.
The other listed chemicals are retained only briefly. It takes only four hours of breath-
ing air for the body to eliminate half of the carbon monoxide previously inhaled. Robert E.
Gosselin, Harold C. Hodge, Roger P. Smith, and Marion Gleason, Clinical Toxicology of
Commercial Products 88 (1976).
Inhalation is the principal means of exposure to vinyl chloride. Animal studies indicate
that within seventy-two hours of inhalation, most vinyl chloride has been eliminated. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, Ambient Water Quality Criteria for Vinyl Chloride, EPA No.
44015-80-078 at C-8, C-15 (Oct. 1980).
Carbon tetrachloride remains in the blood for no more than forty-eight hours after in-
halation and is no longer detectable in expired air after six days. EPA, Ambient Water
Quality Criteria for Carbon Tetrachloride, EPA No. 44015-80-026 at C-23 (Oct. 1980).
Benzene exposure occurs primarily (perhaps exclusively) through inhalation. The time
necessary to eliminate benzene is related to duration of exposure; however, the half-life of
benzene retention in animal studies ranged from only 0.4 hours to 1.6 hours. EPA, Ambient
Water Quality Criteria for Benzene, EPA No. 44015-80-018 at C-9, C-14 (Oct. 1980).
The body eliminates 6 to 10 percent of retained carbon disulfide in expired air three to
eight hours after exposure ends. The body seems to excrete the remainder in urine as inor-
ganic sulfates and organic sulfur compounds for twenty-four hours after exposure ends.
Ralph P. McKee, Cemal Kiper, John H. Fountain, et al., A Solvent Vapor, Carbon Disulfide,
122 J. Amer. Med. Assoc. 217, 220, 222 (1943).
71 Olin Industry Brief at 43 (cited in note 49) (also referring to "problems of adminis-
trative feasibility").
Curiously, some of the employers who have chosen to exclude all fertile women rather
than administer pregnancy tests have adopted mandatory drug testing programs. For exam-
ple, American Cyanamid and Olin test all applicants for drugs. Phone call with Dr. Utidjian
of American Cyanamid (June 25, 1986); letter from Olin (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review). Delco-Remy screens all applicants and employees in vehicle testing
(see letter on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
75 If pregnancy testing, as a third alternative, would be intrusive and too great an inva-
sion of privacy, then offering women a choice only between proving sterility and a desired
job should also be considered intrusive and too great an invasion of privacy.
7' See, e.g., note 194 below.
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3. The evidence. Like sex-specific protectionist legislation,
sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies have been adopted without
firm empirical evidence. Little is known about the risks associated
with women's on-the-job exposure to ionizing radiation or hazard-
ous chemicals at current exposure levels. As the Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment recently reported:
What is known about reproductive health hazards is far out-
weighed by what is unknown: most commercial chemicals
have not been thoroughly evaluated for their possible toxic ef-
fects on reproduction and development. Much of the informa-
tion on suspected reproductive health hazards, as with other
hazards, is derived from animal studies, which present
problems of interpretation in extrapolating to effects in
humans. There are consequently no reliable estimates as yet
of the basic measures of reproductive risk in the work-
place-the number of workers exposed to such hazards, their
levels of exposure, and the toxicity of the agents to which they
are exposed.77
77 Reproductive Health Hazards at 3 (cited in note 35). A 1983 study prepared in coop-
eration with the President's Council on Environmental Quality, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, The National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, The National Insti-
tute for Occupational Safety and Health, and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration concludes:
The present state of scientific knowledge of chemical hazards to reproduction is some-
what similar to the state of knowledge of chemical carcinogens in the late 1960s. While
a number of drugs and occupational exposures were known to be associated with excess
cancer incidence, and many chemicals were known to be carcinogenic in experimental
animals, the overall contribution of chemical agents to the cancer burden in the general
population could not be assessed, the reliability of animal experiments for prediction of
human risks was in dispute, and the development of dose-response models and risk
assessment procedures had scarcely begun.
The regulatory situation was also similar: only a few chemical carcinogens (other
than drugs) had been regulated by federal agencies, and very few of these regulatory
actions had been taken on the basis of animal data alone. The subsequent development
of procedures for protection depended on the progressive improvement of scientific
knowledge. By analogy, it can be anticipated that the acquisition of more knowledge
about the effects of chemical agents on reproduction will provide the basis both for
estimates of the hazards they pose and for a regulatory program.
It is not clear that chemical hazards to reproduction will prove to be as large a
public health issue as chemical carcinogens. However, if reproductive hazards are an
important regulatory problem, they should be predicted with as much scientific knowl-
edge as possible. The primary purpose of this report is to draw attention to the rele-
vant scientific issues at an early stage in their development, so that research programs
can be focused on these critical issues before they become public controversies.
Nisbet and Karch, Chemical Hazards at 114-15 (cited in note 71).
See also, e.g., Peter C. Holmberg and Kari Kurppa, General Description and Some Pre-
liminary Results of a Case-Referent Study on Selected Congenital Defects and Environmen-
tal Exposures, in K. Hemminki, M. Sorsa, and H. Vainio, eds., Occupational Hazards and
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Most of the evidence of reproductive health hazards is of little
use. Much of it was compiled when women workers were exposed
to higher levels of toxins78 or when tragedies (such as the atomic
bomb 9) resulted in higher exposure levels; and much of it is based
on animal studies of uncertain applicability.80 Epidemiological evi-
dence-evidence from the study of outcomes based on incidence of
diseases in human populations-is scant and, because of method-
ological problems, rarely conclusive.8'
Like sex-specific protectionist legislation, fetal vulnerability
policies have excluded women from jobs without firm evidence that
the jobs present greater risks for women than for men. There is no
sound scientific evidence that the risks associated with paternal ex-
posure are lower than those associated with maternal exposure.8 2
Few studies have been done on the reproductive risks associated
with male exposure. s The studies that have been done indicate
that it is likely that agents dangerous to the fetus through mater-
nal exposure are also dangerous through paternal exposure.84 For
Reproduction 275 (1985) ("The evidence suggestive of exposures at work sites as contribu-
tors in teratogenesis [fetal malformation caused by exposure to chemical or.physical agent]
is circumstantial at best."); Joanna F. Haas and David Schottenfeld, Risks to the Offspring
from Parental Occupational Exposures, 21 J. Occup. Med. 607, 607 (1979) ("Evidence for
impaired pregnancies and hazards to the offspring of working populations with chemical
exposures is, however, very limited."); Vilma R. Hunt, Work and the Health of Women 217
(1979) (for both paternal and maternal exposure, "[a]t present, it is difficult to assess risk
for reproductive effect at all").
7S For example, although lead is a well-documented fetal hazard at high exposure
levels, there is little data available about its reproductive effects at current exposure levels.
See, e.g., Maureen Hatch, Mother, Father, Worker, in Chavkin, ed., Double Exposure at 161,
171 (cited in note 1).
79 See, e.g., National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, Review of
NCRP Radiation Dose Limit for Embryo and Fetus in Occupationally-Exposed Women 13-
16 (NCRP Report No. 53, Mar. 1, 1977) ("Radiation Dose Report").
30 See, e.g., Reproductive Health Hazards at 3 (cited in note 35).
81 See id. at 8-9, 67-68.
82 See Pregnancy Guidelines at 3 (cited in note 61) (footnote omitted):
Little is known about the factors which cause birth defects, mutagenesis, or fetal carci-
nogenesis and how they may be related to occupational exposures. Many of these ad-
verse effects are the result of the genetic effects of occupational exposures of men prior
to conception. Most fetal damage, however, is not ascribable to any known cause.
See also Reproductive Health Hazards at 69-111 (cited in note 35) (comparing data for
males and females for a wide variety of toxic chemicals); Scott, Keeping Women in Their
Place at 183-84 (cited in note 1).
8' See, e.g., Nisbet and Karch, Chemical Hazards at 14 (cited in note 71); Hunt, Work
and the Health of Women at 155 (cited in note 77); Haas and Schottenfeld, 21 J. Occup.
Med. at 607 (cited in note 77).
, The Nisbet and Karch study concludes:
The scientific basis for differential regulation is limited. Reproduction involves a wider
range of processes in females than in males, and some processes in females involve
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example, some toxic agents, such as heavy metals, pesticides, and
solvents "have been shown to cause infertility in males as well as
adverse pregnancy outcomes resulting from mutations in male
germ cells."18 5 Paternal exposure to toxic agents can cause harm be-
cause of abnormalities in the fertilizing sperm, or because of the
transmission of dangerous agents in intercourse during pregnancy
(for example, lead has been found in semen of male workers), or
because male workers bring contaminants home on their clothes,
hair, skin, etc.88 The precise relative risks are unknown.8 7 Often, a
fertile male will pose a greater risk to fetal safety than a fertile,
nonpregnant female. Spermatogenesis is an ongoing process,
whereas the female's ova all are produced by early infancy, and
rapidly dividing cells are more susceptible to a number of inju-
ries.8 8 Also, some substances, such as lead, "'concentrate in the
male reproductive tract [and] are quite toxic to sperm.' ,,89
4. Potential offspring are protected only when women are
perceived as marginal workers. During the protectionist era,
women were excluded from jobs only when they were not key
workers. Similarly, women and their children are "protected" by
fetal vulnerability policies only when women are perceived as mar-
ginal members of the work force. Fetal vulnerability policies ex-
cluding all fertile women have been adopted only in male-domi-
critical periods of differentiation and development. However, it does not necessarily
follow that women are more sensitive to the action of any given agent. Where extensive
data have been compiled on both sexes (e.g., for anesthetic gases and smelter emis-
sions), evidence has been found for adverse effects resulting from exposure of both men
and women, including some evidence for adverse fetal effects following exposure of
males. More evidence is required to establish whether males and females differ in sen-
sitivity. Such evidence should include not only the occurrence of effects in each sex,
but also the nature of the effects and the doses at which they occur.
Nisbet and Karch, Chemical Hazards at 114 (cited in note 71).
See also Reproductive Health Hazards at 69-111 (cited in note 35); Scott, Keeping
Women in Their Place at 183-84 (cited in note 1); Haas and Schottenfeld, Risks to Offspring
at 607 (cited in note 77).
85 Nisbet and Karch, Chemical Hazards at 14 (cited in note 71), citing J.M. Manson,
Human and Laboratory Test Systems Available for Detection of Reproductive Failure, 7
Prev. Med. 322-31 (1978). See also Jane E. Brody, Sperm Found Especially Vulnerable to
Environment, N.Y. Times p. Cl (Mar. 10, 1981).
8 See Naeye and Tafari, Risk Factors at 7 (cited in note 71); Seminaro, AFL-CIO
American Federationist at 20 (cited in note 34); Nisbet and Karch, Chemical Hazards at 14-
15 (cited in note 71).
97 See authorities cited in notes 82-85 above.
88 Barry S. Levy and David H. Wegman, eds., Occupational Health 308 (1983).
88 Brody, N.Y. Times at C1 (Mar. 10, 1981) (cited in note 85) (quoting Dr. John Mac-
Leod). Sperm may be damaged (as well as killed) by toxic agents; damaged sperm may
result in deformed children. See authorities cited in note 85 above.
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nated industries. ° Despite similar risks, such policies have not
been adopted in industries in which a substantial number of work-
ers are women.
91
The electronics industry, for example, employs mostly
women,91 and many of these women frequently come into contact
with six of the seven substances listed above:93 lead, benzene, vinyl
chloride, carbon tetrachloride, carbon monoxide, and carbon disul-
fide. Yet fetal vulnerability policies have not been instituted in this
industry.94 Many women laundry workers and dry cleaners are ex-
posed to carbon disulfide and benzene. 95 Women laboratory techni-
cians are often exposed to benzene and other dangerous chemi-
cals.96 Infectious agents and chemicals create risks of fetal harm to
health care workers and hospital laundry workers. Dental offices
are often contaminated by mercury.9 Pottery painting, a tradition-
ally female job, involves exposure to lead.9 Yet with the exception
of hospitals that fire pregnant x-ray technicians or otherwise re-
so See, e.g., Hunt, Work and the Health of Women at 97-98 (cited in note 77); Robert
Howard, Brave New Workplace 141, 165 (1985); Robin Baker and Sharon Woodrow, The
Clean, Light Image of the Electronics Industry: Miracle or Mirage?, in Chavkin, ed., Double
Exposure 21-22 (cited in note 1).
91 See, e.g., sources cited in note 1.
92 Baker and Woodrow, The Clean, Light Image, in Chavkin, ed., Double Exposure at
21-22 (cited in note 90).
93 See text at note 34.
" See Baker and Woodrow, The Clean, Light Image, in Chavkin, ed., Double Exposure
at 21-23 (cited in note 90); Cynthia E. Talbot, Toxic Substances Commonly Found in Elec-
tronics: A Guide for Health Professionals, Project on Health and Safety in Electronics,
Santa Clara Center for Occupational Safety & Health (1981); Santa Clara Center for Occu-
pational Safety & Health, Unmasking the Hazards, A Workers' Guide to Job Hazards in the
Electronics Industry (1981).
In contrast, sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies have become common in the tradi-
tionally male petrochemical industry. The newer electronics industry is a "close cousin" to
the petrochemical industry in terms of health and safety risks as a result of chemical expo-
sure, though the older petrochemical industry is more concerned about safety than the
young and highly competitive microelectronics industry. Howard, Brave New Workplace at
141, 165 (cited in note 90).
9' See, e.g., Nancy Miller Chenier, Reproductive Hazards at Work 45 (1982). A "quar-
ter of a million women work in laundries and dry cleaning establishments." Seminaro, AFL-
CIO American Federationist at 19 (cited in note 34).
98 See Seminaro, AFL-CIO American Federationist at 19.
91 See, e.g., Chenier, Reproductive Hazards at 28-32 (cited in note 95); Linda Coleman
and Cindy Dickinson, The Risks of Healing: The Hazards of the Nursing Profession, in
Chavkin, ed., Double Exposure at 37, 44-50 (cited in note 1) (describing fetal hazards of
nursing). These risks are not unique to maternal exposure. The children of men working in
these occupations may also be at risk. Chenier, Reproductive Hazards at 28 (cited in note
95).
98 James C. Hyatt, Protection for Unborn? Work-Safety Issue Isn't as Simple as it
Sounds, Wall St. J., p. 1, col. 1, p. 31, col. 3 (Aug. 2, 1977).
99 Stellman and Henifin, No Fertile Women Need Apply at 120 (cited in note 1).
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strict their exposure, women are generally allowed to work in
women's jobs without restrictions based on fetal safety.
This should not be surprising. An employer faced with evi-
dence that a group is hypersusceptible (even if the heightened risk
is very low) is likely to make the decision to exclude that group
based, not on the costs and benefits to the workers and their fami-
lies, but on the employer's need for members of that group in its
labor force. If the group is very marginal-as women are in tradi-
tionally male jobs1 0--the employer has every incentive to exclude
the group's members even though the heightened risks may be
very low (or only vague worries 01) and the benefits of allowing the
'0 At American Cyanamid, the corporate medical director developed a fetal vulnerabil-
ity policy, excluding women from certain production jobs, when women began bidding on
these jobs because he was "concerned that this change in employment patterns might pose a
risk to the embryos and fetuses of employees." Reproductive Health Hazards at 252 (cited
in note 35). Initially, the policy only applied to female production workers, not research or
laboratory jobs traditionally held by women. Id. at 253. Eventually, the policy was expanded
to cover these workers, but "the policy was never in fact enforced for laboratory workers."
Id. at 256.
At Olin Corporation "until approximately 1975, Olin expressly required that craft main-
tenance positions be filled by males only." Brief for Appellants EEOC and Wright on Ap-
peal in Wright v. Olin Corp. at 16 ("Olin Plaintiff's Brief"). Although other positions were
not formally limited to only one sex, an Olin employment supervisor testified that certain
jobs were "definitely" women's jobs and others "strictly men's jobs." Id. at 9. Women moved
into men's jobs in nontrivial numbers only after pressure from the General Services Admin-
istration about Olin's failure to comply with requirements for government contractors. Id. at
5-26. Thereafter, Olin developed a fetal vulnerability policy excluding fertile women from
traditionally male jobs.
'01 Robert M. Clyne, Corporate Medical Director of American Cyanamid Co., described
the evidence supporting American Cyanamid's and Olin's sex-specific fetal vulnerability pol-
icies as follows:
Threshold limit values for fertile females . . . were arrived at solely by professional
judgment and 'educated guessing' and certainly are not based on any clinico-laboratory
experience. We admit that we are ultraconservative.. . . Others have been somewhat
less restrictive about threshold limit values for fertile females such as Dr. O'Connell of
Olin who has stated that they use half the present threshold limit value for adults..
Neither of us has any good documentation for adopting the levels we have.
This same medical director
was unwilling to exclude fertile men in the absence of "epidemiological studies indicat-
ing that the compound was indeed a human mutagen." He would not be persuaded by
animal studies showing evidence of a chemical's mutagenic effect on sperm and claims
that "the only meaningful information that [he] would accept is epidemiological
information."
Reproductive Health Hazards at 255 (cited in note 35).
The Office of Technology Assessment reports that this medical director excluded fertile
women (ages 16 to 55) from exposure to twenty-nine chemicals without any specific infor-
mation about fetal risk associated with maternal exposure for twenty-eight of the twenty-
nine. Id. at 253. Acrylamide was on the list, though the director knew that NIOSH had
concluded that no fetal risk was known to be associated with the chemical. Id. at 255. Be-
cause of labor problems, American Cyanamid subsequently conducted a study (the only
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group to work (benefits in this case to both women and their chil-
dren) are very high.
Women are "marginal" potential workers for traditionally
male blue-collar jobs in the sense that women are likely to be less
attractive as employees than men are. Employing women in these
jobs entails added costs in providing washrooms and, for many jobs
involving exposure to hazardous chemicals, showers for washing off
chemicals at the end of the work day. Protective equipment, cloth-
ing, and tools designed for women rather than men may be
necessary.
Often, men in traditionally male jobs are hostile to women as
co-workers. Admitting women is therefore likely to be disruptive,
and employers understandably dislike disruptions and disputes
among employees. In such an environment, a new female employee
is likely to be less productive than a new male employee because,
for example, on-the-job training is likely to be more difficult for
the new woman worker to acquire.102
Policies excluding all fertile women have arisen mostly, per-
haps entirely, in unionized industries with rigid pay scales. 03 Em-
ployers in these industries cannot offset the high costs of employ-
ing women by paying women lower wages, because such a
differential would be an obvious violation of the Equal Pay Act. 04
In addition, unionized employers are likely to pay higher than the
average wages and therefore are able to hire as many workers as
they desire without employing women.
For all these reasons, employers with traditionally male blue-
collar work forces are likely to have no financial reason for employ-
ing women; all financial considerations are likely to argue for ex-
clusion. And, of course, if the concern (or vague worry) about
study conducted by the company) of acrylamide and removed it from the list because there
was no reason to believe that it was a fetal hazard. Id. at 255.
102 See generally Mary Lindenstein Walshok, Blue Collar Women (1981).
103 The companies known to have policies excluding all fertile women include: Olin,
American Cyanamid, Union Carbide, General Motors, Bunker Hill, Allied Chemical, B.F.
Goodrich, Monsanto, St. Joe's Minerals, ASARCO, Sun Oil, Gulf Oil, and Delco-Remy. For
evidence that production workers tend to be unionized in these companies, see, e.g., Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp.,
440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); The
Bunker Hill Co. v. Local 7854, 210 NLRB 343 (1974); Allied Chemical Corp. v. District 50,
151 NLRB 718 (1965); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Local 281, 115 NLRB 722 (1956); Monsanto
Chemical Co. v. Local 16, 130 NLRB 1097 (1961); McGhee, The Progressive (Oct. 1977) at
20-21 (cited in note 58) (St. Joe's plant with a policy excluding all fertile women from jobs
involving lead exposure was unionized); Federated Metals Corp. v. Local 365, 648 F.2d 856
(3d Cir. 1981) (Federated Metals is a wholly owned subsidiary of ASARCO).
101 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
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hypersusceptibility turns out to be well-founded, exclusion has the
potential of saving money.
Similar factors are particularly likely to be present when preg-
nant women are fired or their employment restricted. Even for jobs
held predominantly by women, employers are likely to perceive
pregnant workers as unneeded or unwanted relative to non-
pregnant workers. For a number of reasons, only a few of which are
mentioned here, a pregnant woman is likely to be regarded as less
reliable. She may have to be replaced, at least temporarily, at the
time of delivery, and she may decide not to return to work, or to
return only after taking several months off. For employers who
self-insure medical coverage for their employees, or those whose
future insurance premiums depend on current payouts, the preg-
nant worker is a very costly employee, and no short-term benefits
to the employer are associated with the higher costs. Many em-
ployers would prefer to replace the pregnant worker immediately
and permanently than to continue to employ her. Thus, pregnant
workers are marginal workers even in women's jobs.
5. Women as decision makers. As in the earlier debate over
protectionist legislation, proponents of fetal vulnerability policies
have not discussed whether women might be trusted to decide for
themselves what is in the interest of themselves and their current
and potential families. Yet as between the woman and the em-
ployer, the woman is likely to be the better decision maker.
In adopting fetal vulnerability policies, employers err system-
atically in favor of fetal safety. Employers assume that the
probability that any fertile woman will become pregnant while em-
ployed at the hazardous job or while her body still retains hazard-
ous chemicals is high enough to warrant her exclusion. Employers
have no financial incentive to consider the advantages of employ-
ment to a woman, to her living dependents, to her unborn and un-
conceived children, and to society.
Unlike the employer, the individual woman can take into ac-
count the advantages and disadvantages of a particular job for her-
self and her dependents, including her future children, in light of
the probability that she will have another child while fetal health
is at risk from occupational exposure. 05 In addition, the woman
can control the timing of pregnancy to protect fetal health. 10
105 Under existing regulations, employers are required to give employees information
about health hazards. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.96(i), 1910.1017(j), 1910.1025(1) (1985)
(disclosure requirements for ionizing radiation, vinyl chloride, and lead, respectively).
1o At Olin, for example, twenty-six women worked for two years in "controlled" jobs.
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It might be argued that, in balancing the advantages and dis-
advantages of hazardous employment, women will give too little
weight to potential injuries to potential children. It is true that
women will err more on the side of fetal risk than will employers
who adopt fetal vulnerability policies; these employers err only on
the side of fetal safety. But unless risks to potential people, who
may never exist, are to be valued above all other interests, includ-
ing the actual needs of living women and living children, women
are better decision makers than employers who would exclude all
fertile women.
Pregnant women are likely to be particularly concerned with
fetal health, and quite interested in protecting it. If a pregnant wo-
man, informed of the risks of occupational exposure, nevertheless
continues in the job, it is quite likely that the alternatives to haz-
ardous employment are worse for her unborn child and her other
dependents than are the risks of employment.
There are other reasons why women, and not employers,
should make these decisions. Even if a particular individual wo-
man reaches the same decision the employer would have reached,
the woman who makes the decision herself will feel that she, rather
than others, is in control of her life. A woman's interest in auton-
omy is an important reason for allowing her to make decisions
about smoking and drinking before and during pregnancy. 10 7 There
is much more evidence that cigarettes and alcohol cause serious
injuries to the developing fetus than that workplace toxins do so. 08
The risks associated with decisions to smoke or drink during preg-
nancy seem less likely to benefit living and potential children than
the risks associated with employment.
Finally, if individual employers can decide whether to exclude
women on the basis of fetal vulnerability, women and their poten-
See note 40. None of these women, however, became pregnant during those two years. See
Olin ACLU Brief at 5 (cited in note 40). Because these controlled jobs involve some expo-
sure to suspected reproductive hazards, other employers with more restrictive policies might
have excluded all of these women from the jobs because each could have become pregnant
at any moment.
Although little is known about risks of fetal damage due to parental occupational expo-
sure, a fair amount is known about how long chemicals are retained in the body. See, e.g.,
notes 70 and 73 above.
107 Women's interest in autonomy is also part of the basis for their constitutional right
to abortions under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 162 (1973). However, this constitutional
right is of limited relevance to women's right to work despite fetal vulnerability. Hazardous
employment might lead to a living, deformed child. The constitutional right to an abortion
does not include the right to risk the health of a fetus that can survive on its own. See id. at
163-64.
108 See, e.g., Haas and Schottenfeld, 21 J. Occup. Med. at 607 (cited in note 77).
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tial children will not be excluded whenever a certain level of fetal
risk exists. Instead, they will be excluded only when employers
choose to adopt exclusionary policies. This means that women and
their potential children will be excluded-as in the era of sex-spe-
cific protectionist legislation-only when women are perceived as
marginal workers. But jobs for which women are marginal workers
are likely to offer higher pay and better benefits than the women
otherwise would be able to receive. Thus, employers are likely to
adopt fetal vulnerability policies excluding fertile or pregnant
women only when the dangerous job offers a real advantage to the
women and their living and potential children.
C. Employers' Desire to Avoid Harm
Employers today make an additional argument, one not ad-
vanced during the debate over protectionist legislation: that the
prospect of the employer's causing fetal harm is a legitimate basis
for excluding women, both on moral grounds and in light of the
employer's potential tort liability.""9 Closer analysis reveals, how-
ever, that this argument also rests on troubling assumptions that
were made during the earlier debate.
The moral strand of this argument is that employers should
not be forced to be the cause of harm to the next generation. Life
is, however, more complicated. Firing a pregnant woman, or refus-
ing to give a higher-paying traditionally male job to a fertile wo-
man, may cause more harm to the next generation (including living
members of that generation) than would dangerous employment.
The employer may feel more responsible for fetal harm if the wo-
man is employed than for consequences to the woman and her de-
pendents if she is not employed, because the latter harms are in-
visible to the employer. But these consequences are no less real.
The moral argument, like the arguments criticized earlier, ignores
the actual alternatives facing the excluded woman and her depen-
dents and assumes that her reproductive role is more important to
the welfare of her offspring than her economic role.
The other strand of this argument, focusing on tort liability,
asserts that employers should not be put to the choice of violating
101 In the earlier debate, proponents did argue that sex-specific legislation was appro-
priate for moral reasons, for example, protecting the health of the next generation and the
morals of its mothers. See section I-A above. But (perhaps because the policies were enacted
by the state and in the absence of any bans on sex discrimination), proponents did not
argue that exclusion was justified because otherwise employers would be the cause of harm
to the next generation.
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Title VII or being held liable in tort if a child is born deformed as
a result of maternal exposure at work. Employers stress that they
have no way to protect themselves from tort liability, because a
woman cannot waive the rights of her unborn or unconceived chil-
dren. Thus, they urge, Title VII should be interpreted to permit
sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies.
Ineffectiveness of maternal waiver is not, however, the prob-
lem. It is impossible to state with certainty the standard for em-
ployer liability in tort for injuries to workers' children. Because
of workers' compensation, the cases most closely analogous-
involving injuries to workers themselves-have not been brought in
tort for many years. Under general tort principles, however, there
would seem to be no basis for holding an employer liable for fetal
harm if Title VII bans sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies, 110
the employer fully informs the woman of the risks, and the em-
ployer has not acted in a negligent manner."1 ' Indeed, without neg-
ligence, it would be difficult to find causation by the employer.1 2
The employer has done only what it was legally obligated to do
under Title VII, i.e., afford equal employment opportunity to fer-
tile and pregnant women.11 3 Waiver of negligence by the worker
herself would be ineffective in most jurisdictions, 1 4 so the ineffec-
tiveness of maternal waiver is irrelevant. The critical difference be-
tween the worker's action, and the negligence action brought by
the child, is that the worker's claim must be brought under a work-
ers' compensation system, whereas the child could sue in tort. 5
110 The argument that Title VII must permit these policies because otherwise employ-
ers will be liable in tort overlooks the fact that Title VII's nondiscrimination mandate will
affect the scope of employer liability in tort.
"I See Lucinda M. Finley, The Exclusion of Fertile Women from the Hazardous Work-
place, in Proceedings of NYU Thirty-Eighth Annual National Conference on Labor 16-1, 16-
35 to 16-40 (1985) ("Labor Conference Proceedings") (concluding that tort liability is un-
likely in the absence of negligence, and noting that when prenatal torts have been actiona-
ble, the basis of liability has been negligence towards the mother).
1'2 In addition, it is only claims based on negligence that parents can never waive. Par-
ents can waive compensation rights arising from intentional torts (e.g., medical treatment).
See Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206 (Me. 1979); Kaufman v. American Youth Hos-
tels, 174 N.Y.S.2d 580, 589 (Sup. Ct. 1957); W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E.
Keeton, and David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 18 at 115 (5th ed. 1984) ("Pros-
ser & Keeton").
'" The mother might be liable in tort to the child for injuries sustained because the
mother took unreasonable risks.
114 Prosser & Keeton § 68 at 482 n.22 (cited in note 112).
'15 An employer might also be liable in tort if the child brought a products liability
claim against a third party (e.g., the manufacturer of the hazardous chemical or the negli-
gent repairer of a safety device) and the third party counterclaimed against the employer for
either contribution or indemnity. Unless the employer has expressly promised to indemnify
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Tort liability, though a potential loss associated with the em-
ployment of women in some situations, must be seen in perspec-
tive. Even if the child could prove negligence on the part of the
employer, physical causation would have to be established. Al-
though physical causation can be shown for many toxic torts, the
lack of firm evidence linking maternal occupational exposure to fe-
tal injury (discussed above'1 6) would make physical causation for
fetal torts difficult to prove. As additional evidence, consider the
dearth of cases alleging such injuries as a result of maternal expo-
sure, despite the fact that women have been exposed to hazardous
agents in women's jobs. Some of the Agent Orange litigation, in-
volving paternal exposure to dioxin allegedly causing birth defects,
was dismissed for failure to prove causation.117 Further, as the
Agent Orange example itself suggests, potential tort liability for fe-
tal injury is not uniqud to women workers. All of the scientific evi-
dence indicates that those agents that are reproductive hazards for
fertile or pregnant women are also hazards for fertile men or men
whose wives are pregnant.11 8 Although no participant in the cur-
rent debate has been able to point to a single instance of a child
allegedly damaged as a result of maternal occupational exposure, " 9
fetal injury due to paternal occupational exposure has been alleged
in a number of instances in addition to the Agent Orange
litigation. 1 0
the third party against such liability, however, the employer would be indirectly liable for
the child's injury only if the employer was negligent. See Arthur Larson, 2A The Law of
Workmen's Compensation § 76 at 14-561 to 14-765 (1983).
116 See notes 77-81 and accompanying text above.
"" See Finley, Exclusion of Fertile Women, in Labor Conference Proceedings at 16-38
n.8 (cited in note 111).
1'8 See notes 82-89 and accompanying text above.
11 See, e.g., Joan E. Bertin, Workplace Bias Takes the Form of 'Fetal Protectionism,'
Legal Times 18, 20 n.3 (Aug. 1, 1983).
120 Male railroad workers in New York have filed claims against the Long Island Rail-
road alleging that their children were born with hip deformities and other birth defects as a
result of paternal exposure to certain defoliant chemicals. Scott, Keeping Women in Their
Place at 190-91 (cited in note 1). A male employee of Occidental Chemical Company has
"charged that his occupational exposure to DBCP caused deformities to his child." See 9
Occup. Safety & Health Rptr. (BNA) 339 (Current Report, Sept. 13, 1979) (suit alleging
that employer had acted intentionally and willfully in disregarding knowledge that DBCP
was in the drinking water of the plant). During 1974-76, five male workers (out of sixty one)
at a plant producing a weed killer, oryzalin, had children born with serious heart defects.
One died at birth, and only one survived extensive surgery to correct the defects. See Scott,
Keeping Women in Their Place at 184 (cited in note 1). The International Chemical Work-
ers Union has asked that the herbicide be banned, alleging that it caused these birth de-
fects. See Phillip Shabecoff, Union, Citing Birth Defects, Asks Ban on a Herbicide, N.Y.
Times p. 16, col. 1 (Nov. 9, 1979). See also Mondelli v. United States, 711 F.2d 567 (3d Cir.
1983) (alleging that paternal exposure to ionizing radiation during atomic testing caused
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Employers fear "open-ended" tort liability for malformed chil-
dren and worry that the risk of such liability may be greater with
maternal employment than with paternal employment. Their fears
are not entirely assuaged by the absence to date of any allegations
of maternal occupational exposure causing fetal harm.12 Employ-
ers may be right. Perhaps when more is known, the risks associated
with maternal exposure will tend to be higher than the risks associ-
ated with paternal exposure. But even then, the problem of poten-
tial tort liability should not be solved simply by excluding
women. 122 A fairer solution would be to modify workers' compensa-
tion systems. Workers' compensation systems could be extended to
cover all fetal injuries associated with parental occupational expo-
sure and to bar any tort action against the employer for losses as-
sociated with such injuries. 23 Statutory schedules, which specify
damage amounts for certain injuries, could be expanded to include
birth defects); Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983) (same).
"I These fears do not seem to be entirely a pretext for keeping women out of tradition-
ally male jobs. Dow does not have any such policies. It has established safe exposure levels
for all chemicals in terms of fetal toxicity and is able to keep exposure below those levels for
all employees. In addition, Dow representatives have indicated that Dow would be very re-
luctant to use any chemical for which there was no "safe exposure level for fetal toxicity."
Rebecca L. Rawls, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, 58 Chem. & Engin. News 35, 37
(Feb. 18, 1980). Thus, Dow seems strongly committed to equal employment opportunities
for women. Yet Dow Medical Director Benjamin B. Holder has stated that if exposure ever
rose too high at any one plant, "we would temporarily transfer the women out and get the
level lower." Id.
12 If employers are allowed to exclude fertile nonpregnant women because of potential
tort liability associated with potential damage to potential fetuses (on the ground that a
woman cannot waive the rights of a nonexistent fetus), it will be the only instance in the
legal universe in which a being that does not yet exist bars absolutely an option that might
be in its own interest as well as in the interest of the living. When the question involves
property, rather than the potential mother's right to work, procedures are available to allow
the living to choose the best option, taking into account the interests of potential benefi-
ciaries; the nonexistent do not wholly restrict the options of the living. See, e.g., Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 110, T 2-501 (1985) (providing for appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
and to bind "persons not in being" who have an interest in real or personal property).
'12 Third-party actions against employers for contribution or indemnity are a possible
source of employer liability in addition to direct actions brought by the injured child. See
note 115 above. However, the extension of workers' compensation statutes to fetal injuries
associated with parental occupational exposure would bar most third-party actions associ-
ated with fetal injury in most jurisdictions. See Larson, 2A Workmen's Compensation § 76
at 14-561 to 14-765 (cited in note 115). Third-party suits against negligent employers would
remain possible in some instances, especially in some jurisdictions. Id. Workers' compensa-
tion statutes could also, however, be modified to bar all such actions. Richard Epstein has
proposed that workers' compensation systems be modified to bar third-party indemnity ac-
tions against employers, and to give third parties an automatic right (regardless of the em-
ployer's negligence) to deduct from their liability to the employee the employee's recovery
under the workers' compensation system. Richard A. Epstein, Coordination of Workers'
Compensation Benefits with Tort Damage Awards, 13 Forum 464 (1978).
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fetal injuries.12 4 Employers could be required to pay the specified
amount for any fetal injury arising out of workplace parental expo-
sure, including medical expenses as well as costs associated with
special education.
There is a more fundamental problem with construing Title
VII to permit sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies because of po-
tential tort liability associated with the employment of women. If
the costs of injury to potential third parties (potential children of
female employees) should not be borne by employers, why should
the costs of avoiding injury to these potential third parties be
borne by women and their living dependents? The tort-based argu-
ment ignores the fact that women and potential offspring are inde-
pendent beings with interests that are not necessarily identical.
Once women and potential children are seen as distinct, the argu-
ment based on tort liability cannot resolve the question: Given Ti-
tle VII's ban on sex discrimination, why should women and their
living dependents, any more than employers, bear the costs of
safety for potential third parties?
In any event, to the extent that the risks of fetal injury associ-
ated with maternal exposure are greater than those associated with
paternal exposure, potential tort liability is an added cost of em-
ploying women. The appropriate question is whether Title VII al-
lows discrimination on the basis of such costs.
II. TITLE VII AND FETAL VULNERABILITY POLICIES
Title VII bans discrimination on the basis of sex unless sex is
a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) for the job in ques-
tion.1' As amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
discrimination on the basis of sex is defined as including discrimi-
nation "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions.' 2 In determining the legality of sex-specific fetal vul-
nerability policies, two issues must therefore be addressed: whether
the plans discriminate on the basis of sex, pregnancy, or related
medical conditions and, if they do, whether such policies are never-
theless permissible under the statutory BFOQ defense.
121 For a description of damages for scheduled injuries under various workers' compen-
sation systems, see United States Chamber of Commerce, Analysis of Workers' Compensa-
tion Laws 1985, 20 (1985).
115 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). The BFOQ defense is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
"1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
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A. Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, Pregnancy, or Related
Medical Conditions
Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert,1 7 reasonable fetal vulnerability poli-
cies would be permissible. In Gilbert, the Court held that an em-
ployer's decision not to afford medical protection for pregnancy-
related disabilities was not sex discrimination, since it was based
on an underlying factor independent of sex: the cost of coverage.
Congress disagreed and overturned Gilbert with the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). The PDA defines sex discrimi-
nation to include distinctions based on pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions.12 1
In two important post-PDA cases, the Supreme Court has held
that any distinction between men and women, no matter how rea-
sonable, is per se discrimination on the basis of sex, and therefore
a violation of Title VII unless justified by the BFOQ defense. In
Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris"9 and City of Los Ange-
les v. Manhart,5 0 the Court held that employers could not distin-
guish between men and women for pension purposes, though the
distinctions were based on a real difference between men and
women: women, on the average, live longer than men.
Given the PDA, Norris, and Manhart, policies excluding preg-
nant or fertile women from jobs discriminate on the basis of sex,
pregnancy, or related medical conditions and are impermissible
unless the BFOQ defense applies. Policies distinguishing between
pregnant persons and others discriminate on the basis of preg-
nancy, which is prohibited by the PDA.'5 ' Similarly, policies ex-
cluding fertile women discriminate on the basis of sex because they
distinguish between fertile women and fertile men. Such policies
also discriminate on the basis of a medical condition related to
pregnancy because they distinguish between potentially pregnant
127 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
128 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). According to the reports of both houses on the PDA, Congress
considered the approach in Gilbert inconsistent with a proper understanding of Title VII's
nondiscrimination mandate. See Amending Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Sen. Rep.
No. 95-331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) ("PDA Senate Report"); Prohibition of Sex
Discrimination Based on Pregnancy, H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978)
("PDA House Report"). Like the policy at issue in Gilbert, fetal vulnerability policies dis-
tinguish between pregnant (or potentially pregnant) persons and other persons on the basis
of the potentially costly risks associated with pregnancy.
129 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
130 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
M As the House Report put it, under the amended statute "distinctions based on preg-
nancy are per se violations of Title VII." PDA House Report at 3 (cited in note 128).
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persons and others.13 2 Further, Norris and Manhart indicate that
distinctions banned by Title VII are impermissible no matter how
rational, unless justified by the statutory BFOQ defense. 133 Thus,
any sex-specific fetal vulnerability policy is facially discriminatory,
no matter how rational and irrespective of the employer's intent.
The only issue is whether the policy can be justified under the
BFOQ defense.13 4
Neither of the two courts of appeals to consider the legality of
fetal vulnerability policies has adopted this analysis. Although
neither court upheld the sex-specific fetal vulnerability policy at
issue, both indicated that employers could restrict the employment
opportunities of women when such restrictions were "reasonably
required to protect the health of unborn children of women work-
ers against hazards of the workplace."1 35 Specifically, they held
that an employer could restrict the employment of pregnant or fer-
tile women if the employer could show through "independent ob-
jective evidence" that there were significant risks associated with
the exposure of the excluded women, risks not shared by male
132 Reports of both houses indicate that this phrase--"related medical condi-
tions"-was meant to encompass all physiological conditions related to childbearing and
unique to women. See, e.g., PDA Senate Report at 3-4 (cited in note 128) ("the bill defines
sex discrimination. . . to include these physiological occurrences peculiar to women"); PDA
House Report at 5 (cited in note 128) ("In using the broad phrase 'women affected by preg-
nancy, childbirth and related medical conditions,' the bill makes clear that its protection
extends to the whole range of matters concerning the childbearing process.").
,3 See Norris, 463 U.S. at 1084 n.14; Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17 (Title VII does not
contain "a cost-justification defense comparable to the affirmative defense available in a
price discrimination suit . . . neither Congress nor the courts have recognized such a de-
fense under Title VII") (footnotes omitted). In addition to Norris and Manhart, consider
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (hiring fathers of preschool children
while refusing to hire mothers of preschool children is discrimination on the basis of sex);
Michael J. Zimmer and Charles A. Sullivan, The Structure of Title VII Individual Disparate
Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination, and
Burdens of Proof, 9 Harv. Women's L. J. 25, 31-32 (1986) (noting that individual disparate
treatment cases require a showing of intent to discriminate, which is satisfied by, among
other things, showing a conscious intent to treat differently the two races or the two gen-
ders; the employer's motive for making the distinction is irrelevant).
,3, If a differential standard increases job opportunities for minority group members,
the employer might also be able to argue that the differential standard is a permissible part
of an affirmative action plan. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). However, this
defense would not be available in the context of fetal vulnerability policies limiting the
employment opportunities of fertile or pregnant women.
,35 Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1982). In Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543, 1548 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984), the court indicated that it was
adopting the same substantive standard adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Olin. In Olin, the
court remanded to give Olin Corporation the opportunity to present scientific evidence. In
Hayes, the court held that the policy at issue violated Title VII, though reasonable policies
would not.
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workers.13 6 In reaching this conclusion, neither court used the
BFOQ defense.
The courts took rather different approaches to reach this re-
sult without using the BFOQ defense. In Hayes, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a fetal vulnerability policy
under which pregnant x-ray technicians were fired was only pre-
sumptive evidence of facial discrimination. Although the court
conceded that "the Pregnancy Discrimination Act mandates that a
pregnancy-based rule can never be 'neutral,' 1,137 it went on to hold
that an employer could rebut the presumption of discrimination by
showing "that although its policy applies only to women, the policy
is neutral in the sense that it effectively and equally protects the
offspring of all employees."''13 In any other context, the court
would have held that once an employer admitted applying differ-
ent standards to men and women, or to pregnant and nonpregnant
persons, or to Catholics and Protestants, the only remaining issue
would be the availability of the BFOQ defense. 13 The approach of
the court in Hayes thus adds a new defense to overt discrimination
on the basis of sex and pregnancy, a defense lacking any statutory
basis.140
In Olin, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit analyzed
the case as though the sex-specific fetal vulnerability policy, limit-
ing only the employment opportunities of fertile women, did not
involve facial discrimination at all. Instead, the court analyzed the
case as though the plaintiffs were challenging a facially neutral pol-
131 Olin, 697 F.2d at 1190. See also Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
137 726 F.2d at 1547. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982),
involved a challenge to a fetal vulnerability policy like that at issue in Hayes, but the preg-
nant x-ray technician in Zuniga was fired prior to the PDA. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's
result in Zuniga was similar to the result in Hayes. In both cases, the court held that the
policy at issue violated Title VII, though a more reasonable policy would not.
726 F.2d at 1548.
1" The BFOQ defense is never available for distinctions based on race. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e).
140 When an employee alleges that an employer has covertly discriminated on an im-
permissible basis, the employee's prima facie case of discrimination-creating an inference
of discrimination on an impermissible basis-is only presumptive evidence of such discrimi-
nation. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The em-
ployer can introduce evidence to rebut this inference, and the plaintiff then bears the bur-
den of proving that, for example, a different standard was applied to men and women. Id.
The Hayes court used the Burdine approach in a case in which the employer overtly
applied different standards on an impermissible basis (pregnancy). The Burdine approach is
inappropriate in such cases, since the employer has admitted doing that which the Burdine
approach seeks to determine: whether the employer actually treated, for example, men and
women differently. See, e.g., Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (Burdine model not used in case in
which discrimination is overt); Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (same).
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icy with a disparate impact on women. Because the judicially cre-
ated disparate impact model of discrimination was used, the judi-
cially created defense of business necessity was also available."4
The court concluded that the business necessity defense would
support a reasonable sex-specific fetal vulnerability policy. In
reaching this result, the court explained that it was using the dis-
parate impact model of discrimination, rather than the disparate
treatment model, because "properly applied" the BFOQ defense
could not justify sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies, however
reasonable. 142 Thus, the Olin court also recognized a defense to the
disparate treatment banned by Title VII, a defense lacking any
statutory basis.
B. Fetal Vulnerability Policies and the BFOQ Defense
Title VII bans any discrimination on the basis of race, sex
(which includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or related
medical conditions), religion, national origin, or color, unless justi-
fied by the BFOQ defense. Under this statutory exception, an em-
ployer can discriminate on the basis of "religion, sex, or national
origin," but only if "religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of that particular business or enterprise."' 14
3
Little is known about what sorts of discrimination Congress
intended to permit under the BFOQ provision, especially with re-
spect to sex discrimination. The prohibition against sex discrimi-
nation was added to Title VII on the floor of the House, on the last
day of the House debate. 44 The addition of sex to the BFOQ pro-
vision was also added as a floor amendment.145
It is unlikely that the BFOQ provision was intended to permit
widespread discrimination on the basis of sex. 46 On the other
I'l Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
112 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII also contains several more particular exceptions to
liability for overt discrimination, but these exceptions could not apply to fetal vulnerability
policies. See, e.g., § 2000e-2(i) (allowing discrimination in favor of Indians by employers on
or near Indian reservations); § 2000e-1 (allowing discrimination by religious organizations on
the basis of religion and allowing employers to discriminate in employment of aliens outside
the United States).
144 Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 1025, 1027 (1977).
145 110 Cong. Rec. 2718 (Feb. 10, 1964).
14 The Senate rejected a version of the BFOQ provision that would have allowed dis-
crimination whenever it would be "more beneficial to the normal operation of the particular
business or enterprise involved or to the good will thereof than the hiring of an individual
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hand, it is clear that the BFOQ was intended to permit discrimina-
tion in some cases in which sex is not an absolutely necessary qual-
ification for the job. The legislative history gives two examples of
permissible sex discrimination under the BFOQ provision: the
preference of an employer hiring female nurses to care for elderly
female patients14 7 and "the preference of a professional baseball
team for male players. '148
The BFOQ provision has been narrowly interpreted by the
courts.1 49 Discrimination on the basis of sex because of safety con-
cerns has been allowed only in narrow circumstances. In Dothard
v. Rawlinson,'50 for example, the Supreme Court indicated that
danger to the woman herself does not justify discrimination. The
Court allowed the employer to hire only male guards in contact
without consideration of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 110 Cong. Rec. at
13825 (June 15, 1964). And the Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII presented to the
Senate by the floor managers of the bill described the BFOQ as a "limited right to discrimi-
nate." Id. at 7213 (Apr. 8, 1964) (memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case).
147 This example was given by Representative Goodell, in proposing on the floor of the
House that the 3FOQ be expanded to cover sex discrimination as well. Id. at 2718.
148 This example was given in the Senate Interpretii'e Memorandum. Id. at 7213. The
only other examples of any discrimination permissible under the BFOQ provision are "the
preference of a French restaurant for a French cook," and "the preference of a business
which seeks the patronage of members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that
religion." These examples are also included in the Senate Interpretive Memorandum. Id.
149 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, courts have allowed employers to dis-
criminate on the basis of sex when no other alternative will protect a client's privacy. The
privacy exception itself has, however, been narrowly construed. See Sirota, 55 Tex. L. Rev.
at 1060 (cited in note 144). Employers also might be able to discriminate on the basis of sex
when sex appeal is a truly critical aspect of the service being provided by the employer.
Thus, a Playboy club might be able to discriminate on the basis of sex in hiring "bunnies,"
though an airline cannot discriminate on that basis in hiring stewards and stewardesses. See
Charles A. Sullivan, Michael J. Zimmer, and Richard F. Richards, Federal Statutory Law of
Employment Discrimination 140-41, 148-49 (1980); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F.
Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). An employer can also discriminate on the basis of sex when so-
called "authenticity" is important to the job, the common examples being the employment
of male actors and female actresses. See Sullivan, Zimmer, and Richards, Employment Dis-
crimination at 148.
In addition, an employer can set different dress codes for men and women provided
that the dress codes are more or less equivalent for men and women in terms of contempo-
rary notions of proper dress wear. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.,
507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (holding that such dress codes do not consti-
tute sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII and that consideration of BFOQ
provision was therefore unnecessary).
An employer cannot, however, employ only males because (a) the job is dangerous; (b)
the job is more dangerous for women (or most women) than for men; (c) a woman would
face special difficulties because of likely harassment; (d) the job is beyond the strength of
most women; (e) customers or co-workers prefer men; (f) employing women would be more
costly. See Sullivan, Zimmer, and Richards, Employment Discrimination at 137-49; Sirota,
55 Tex. L. Rev. at 1027 (cited in note 144).
150 433 U.S. 321, 335 n.21 (1977).
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areas of maximum security male penitentiaries only because more
was at stake than the "individual woman's decision to weigh and
accept the risks of employment." 151 The Court found sex a BFOQ
because the employment of a woman would create real risks of
safety to others if violence broke out because the guard was a wo-
man. Sex discrimination was tolerated because sex was related to
the guard's ability to do the job: maintaining order.
Similarly, some courts have allowed airlines to lay off pregnant
stewardesses at varying points during the first five months of preg-
nancy on the ground that the employer's policy was necessary to
ensure the safety of passengers.1 52 Here, too, discrimination is per-
mitted because pregnancy interferes with ability to do the job:
pregnancy might prevent a stewardess from performing duties dur-
ing an emergency.
Thus, although the BFOQ has been construed as allowing sex
or pregnancy discrimination on the basis of safety concerns, the
"safety exception" has been limited to instances in which sex or
pregnancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to per-
form the job. This approach is consistent with the language of the
BFOQ provision itself, which suggests that permissible distinctions
based on sex must relate to ability to do the job. Unlike the safety
of customers or even co-workers, the safety of the fetus is not di-
rectly related to ability to do the job.
The safety exception is, however, the result of judicial con-
struction of a vague statutory provision; it could be extended to
include distinctions based on fetal vulnerability. The BFOQ has, in
a few other contexts, been construed as permitting discrimination
unrelated to ability to do the job. 15 3 There are, however, two rea-
161 Id.
151 See Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980);
Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); Condit v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977); In re National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. Fla.
1977); MacLennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1977); ALPA v.
Western Air Lines, 23 Fair Empl. Pract. Cases 1042 (N.D. Cal. 1979); E.E.O.C. v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd and remanded without published opin-
ion, 619 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1980).
In two of these cases, the courts indicated that fetal safety was best left to the mother.
Burwell, 633 F.2d at 371; National Airlines, 434 F. Supp. at 259.
"' As the legislative history itself suggests, the BFOQ provision has never been limited
to distinctions based on ability to do the job. It would, for example, be fairly difficult to
describe the hiring of female nurses for elderly female patients or of only male baseball
players as based on ability to do the job rather than on customer preference. But, with the
exception of cases involving customer privacy and competitive sports (both of which are
specifically mentioned in the legislative history), distinctions based on sex have been per-
mitted only when sex is closely related to ability to do the job (e.g., sex may be a BFOQ for
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sons why the safety exception to Title VII liability for sex or preg-
nancy discrimination should not be expanded to allow fetal vulner-
ability policies that mandate particular standards for pregnant or
fertile women. First, such a construction is inconsistent with the
plain language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and its legisla-
tive history. Second, women will not be adequately protected by a
judicially enforced standard of reasonableness applied to sex-spe-
cific fetal vulnerability policies.
1. The plain language and legislative history of the PDA.
The Congress that passed the PDA addressed a particular problem
with a particular solution. The problem was the marginal status of
women workers because of pregnancy or potential pregnancy: "The
assumption that women will become pregannt [sic] and leave the
labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is
at the root of the discriminatory practices which keep women in
low-paying and dead-end jobs. ' '154 The remedy chosen by Congress
was a specific statutory standard protecting women from employer
decisions based on their marginal status, a standard described thus
in the statute itself:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, in-
cluding receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work. .. .
Both the House and Senate reports indicate that this statutory
Playboy bunnies). See, e.g., Sullivan, Zimmer, and Richards, Employment Discrimination at
148-49 (cited in note 149) (discussing possibility of BFOQ for Playboy bunnies). Employers
cannot, however, make jobs sex-specific by adding a sex-related trait as a job requirement.
For example, courts have refused to allow airlines to employ only female flight attendants
by adding female sex appeal to the job. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 292.
Further, as a general matter, a very high correlation between sex and ability to do the
job has been required for a BFOQ on the basis of sex. For example, when strength is neces-
sary, employers cannot use sex as a proxy for strength, though it would be a fairly accurate
one. Indeed, employers cannot even use height and weight requirements (which have a dis-
parate impact on women) as a proxy for strength. Instead, employers must test individually
to see whether a particular woman has the requisite strength. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333.
114 PDA House Report at 3 (cited in note 128). See also PDA Senate Report at 3 (cited
in note 128) ("As the testimony received by this committee demonstrates, the assumption
that women will become pregnant and leave the labor market is at the core of the sex stere-
otyping resulting in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace.").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (emphasis added).
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standard was deliberately chosen to protect female workers from
being treated as marginal workers by mandating that they be
treated the same as an identifiable group of nonmarginal workers:
others not so affected but similar in ability to do the job.156
For historically marginal workers, a statutory provision man-
dating that they be treated like other workers similar in ability to
do the job is of utmost importance. An employer can then treat the
marginal workers in a particular way only if nonmarginal workers
receive the same treatment.
In light of this statutory standard, the BFOQ defense should
not be expanded to recognize safety concerns unrelated to actual
ability to do the job in the context of pregnancy and potential
pregnancy. To do so would be to remove the protection Congress
adopted as the remedy for discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy and potential pregnancy: women, perceived as marginal be-
cause of pregnancy or potential pregnancy, are to be treated like
others "similar in their ability. . . to do the work."
Two bits of the legislative history of the PDA are particularly
relevant to the question whether the BFOQ should be expanded to
allow reasonable fetal vulnerability policies. 57 First, both the
' "See PDA Senate Report at 4, 6 (cited in note 128) (emphasis added):
Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus
not on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability
to work. Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same
conditions as other employees ...
. . . under this bill, employers will no longer be permitted to force women who
become pregnant to stop working regardless of their ability to continue .
See also PDA House Report at 3, 4, 5, 6 (cited in note 128) (emphasis added):
[Piregnant workers [must] be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their
ability or inability to work....
The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other
employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work ...
The "same treatment" may include employer practices of transferring workers to
lighter assignments .... so long as the requirements and benefits are administered
equally for all workers in terms of their actual ability to perform work ...
In addition to the impact of this bill on fringe benefit programs, other employment
policies which adversely affect pregnant workers are also covered. These policies in-
clude: refusal to hire or promote pregnant women; termination of pregnant women;
mandatory leave for pregnant women arbitrarily established at a certain time during
their pregnancy and not based on their inability to work ...
M In addition to the history discussed in the text, several statements made during the
hearings on the PDA suggest that the PDA bans sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies. At
both the Senate and the House hearings, the Chamber of Commerce submitted a written
statement opposing the PDA because, among other things, it "would prevent an employer
from refusing certain work to a pregnant employee where such work arguably posed a threat
to the health of either the mother-to-be or her unborn child." Furnish, Prenatal Exposure,
66 Iowa L. Rev. at 78 n.72 (cited in note 5), quoting Discrimination on the Basis of Preg-
nancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Human
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House and Senate reports state that the time at which a pregnant
woman should stop working depends only on her ability to do the
work and how employers treat other employees similarly able to do
the work. 5 8 Employment late in pregnancy often imposes risks on
the unborn child, but Congress indicated that the employer may
take into account only the woman's ability to work.
Second, the PDA's legislative history indicates that Congress
considered women, whether or not pregnant, entitled to equal
treatment regardless of significant additional costs to employers or
fellow employees. Estimates of the cost of the PDA varied from a
low of $130 million a year (the AFL-CIO's estimate) to a high of
$571 million (the Health Insurance Industry Association's esti-
mate). The estimate considered most reasonable by the congres-
sional reports, the Department of Labor estimate, was a substan-
tial $191.5 million per year.1 59 Thus, the fact that employers might
face marginally higher risks of tort liability per employee for fe-
male than for male employees because of fetal vulnerability does
not, in itself, justify a difference in treatment under Title VII.
2. The inadequacy of employer decisions. The other major
problem with extending the BFOQ defense to permit "reasonable"
fetal vulnerability policies is that women will not be adequately
protected by employer decisions, even if courts review those deci-
sions for reasonableness. An outright prohibition of such policies is
Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 482 (1977) ("PDA Senate Hearings"); Legislation to Pro-
hibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075
Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1977) ("PDA House Hearings"). See also PDA House Hear-
ings at 88 (oral statement at the House hearing to the same effect by a labor relations attor-
ney testifying for the Chamber of Commerce).
At the Senate hearings, Senator Hatch asked an expert medical witness whether he
thought that the PDA would raise "a whole slew" of "safety and health problems." The
expert responded:
Let me put it this way: I have long been an advocate for a massive increase in research
to deal with the effects of poisons, chemicals, physical and other agents on pregnant
working women. However, two other things: Those agents are just as likely to affect the
ovaries of nonpregnant women and there are in fact today companies that will not hire
women on that specific basis.
But you would never dream of thinking that the same agents might also affect the
testicles of men. So if we are talking about untoward effects of industrial processes on
human procreation, we have to look at the effects on the testicles, and the effects on
ovaries, and the effects on fetuses, all three, and we aren't doing much of that.
PDA Senate Hearings at 67 (cited in this note). Despite these statements, Congress passed
the PDA without any exception for discrimination based on fetal vulnerability.
258 See PDA Senate Report at 6 (cited in note 128); PDA House Report at 4-6 (cited in
note 128).
'59 PDA Senate Report at 10; PDA House Report at 9-10.
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the best approach for a number of reasons.
First, as long as individual employers are allowed to adopt or
reject sex-specific fetal protection policies, such policies will be
adopted only when women are perceived as marginal workers. But,
as noted earlier, when women are perceived as marginal workers, a
job is likely to offer substantial benefits to the excluded women
and their dependents and potential offspring. Fertile women will
be excluded only from higher-paying, traditionally male jobs and
not from lower-paying, traditionally female jobs, even if fetal risks
are the same. Pregnant women will be fired though the fact of
pregnancy means that other employers are also likely to regard
pregnant workers as marginal or unwanted. Often, the pregnant
worker will be unable to find a job with comparable pay and bene-
fits, including medical insurance.
Second, even the most "reasonable" sex-specific fetal vulnera-
bility policy-one supported by evidence of heightened risk associ-
ated with maternal exposure-is likely to be discriminatory in sev-
eral senses. Such a policy turns a difference between men and
women into an advantage for men, and a disadvantage for women,
without compensating women for imposing on them the costs asso-
ciated with ensuring the safety of others. 160
In addition, such a policy is likely to be discriminatory in the
sense that the employer would not adopt a similar policy were the
heightened risk associated with paternal exposure. In the late
1970s, high levels of infertility and sterility were discovered in
male workers exposed to the pesticide DBCP. 161 Employers did not
switch to all-female work forces nor to sterile workforces. Instead,
the EPA banned the chemical for most uses three years after it
was known to cause sterility in male workers.1 62
In contrast, on the basis of animal data linking the pesticide
TOK to birth defects through maternal exposure, the EPA re-
quires that the manufacturer label TOK with this warning:
"Women of childbearing age should not be involved with mixing/
110 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 105 (1979):
"[I]t is not only lies and blindness that have kept women down. It is as much the social
creation of differences, and the transformation of differences into social advantages and dis-
advantages, upon which inequality can rationally be predicated."
,61 At least one lawsuit has been filed, alleging severe birth defects as a result of pater-
nal exposure to DBCP. See note 120 above.
'"2 See Sonia Jasso and Maria Mazorra, Following the Harvest: The Health Hazards of
Migrant and Seasonal Farm Working Women, in Wendy Chavkin, ed., Double Exposure 86,
95-96 (1984); Reproductive Health Hazards at 35-36 (cited in note 35).
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loading or application of this product.1 1, 3 Because of this warning,
growers have denied employment to women. These different re-
sponses to evidence of female and male reproductive hazards tend
to further segregate women at "the lower rungs of the agricultural
workforce.' '164
A recent and comprehensive report on workplace reproductive
hazards by the Office of Technology Assessment notes the different
responses to evidence of female and male reproductive hazards:
The policy ramifications of th[e DBCP] incident are . . sig-
nificant. Male reproductive capacity was found to be endan-
gered by DBCP, but men of reproductive age were not re-
moved from their jobs. Instead, the hazardous agent was
banned. In cases where the potential developmental hazard is
paternally mediated, male workers have not been removed.
The treatment of women workers in similar circumstances
has, in certain cases, been reversed: when developmental
hazards to the embryo/fetus have been identified, the women,
rather than the hazards, have been removed.16 5
There are several reasons why it is more likely that risks asso-
ciated with maternal exposure will be perceived as justifying the
exclusion of women than that risks associated with paternal expo-
sure will be perceived as justifying the exclusion of men.' 6  First,
studies of reproductive hazards associated with occupational expo-
sure have, with a few recent exceptions, focused on maternal rather
than paternal exposure. 117 Thus, there is likely to be more evidence
of risks associated with maternal exposure than of risks associated
with paternal exposure.
Second, we are more worried by new risks than by familiar
ones.16  We are used to the risks associated with men's employ-
ment in men's jobs and women's employment in women's jobs (as
16 EPA Reg. No. 707-92-AA, EPA Est. No. 477-MD-1, TOK WP-50 (produced by
Rohm and Haps), reported in Jasso and Mazorra, Following the Harvest, in Chavkin, ed.,
Double Exposure at 96 (cited in note 162).
16 Jasso and Mazorra, Following the Harvest, in Chavkin, ed., Double Exposure at 96.
If TOK is harmful to male reproductive systems, some male workers may be harmed. But
the point in the text is that decision makers tend to react differently to evidence of male
and female reproductive sensitivity. Women are likely to have their employment opportuni-
ties restricted, but men are not.
115 Reproductive Health Hazards at 35-36 (cited in note 35).
166 See notes 100-01 above, describing different standards used by American Cyana-
mid's medical director in deciding whether to exclude women and men.
1'7 See, e.g., Nisbet and Karch, Chemical Hazards at 14, 22 (cited in note 71); Hunt,
Work and the Health of Women at 155 (cited in note 77).
'6" See Edmund A.C. Crouch and Richard Wilson, Risk/Benefit Analysis 85 (1982).
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well as women's work in their homes), and therefore we are more
likely to worry about the risks associated with women's employ-
ment in men's jobs. Further, the fact that we do not know the pre-
cise dimensions of fetal risk associated with the employment of
women in male jobs-though consistent with the risk being low
and marginal relative to the background risks-operates, irration-
ally, to make us even more risk-averse when facing this new risk.169
Third, the risk of fetal injury is more obvious when the worker
is, or can become, pregnant.170 Employers are less likely to worry
about fetal injury associated with paternal exposure because the
danger from paternal exposure is less obvious.' 7 1 Indeed, the ten-
dency to associate fetal defects with mothers rather than fathers
may result in attributing to mothers defects caused by fathers.'7
Thus, concern for fetal safety is likely to lead to policies that turn
a perceived difference into a disadvantage for women because
women bear children.
Fourth, fetal vulnerability policies are more likely to exclude
women than men because male traits and reactions are typically
regarded as the norm and female traits and reactions (if different)
as the exception for which some adjustment of the normal stan-
dard might be necessary. Scholars have noted this fact in discipline
after discipline, 73 and studies of both physiology and occupational
hazards have been guilty of this bias.7 4 The importance of this in-
sight in the context of fetal vulnerability is obvious. "Normal" peo-
I'l Id. at 82.
170 Until very recently, occupational health researchers have tended to study only re-
productive hazards for women workers (i.e., other kinds of hazards are excluded in studies
of female workers), and to study only other health hazards for male workers (i.e., reproduc-
tive hazards are excluded from studies of male workers). See, e.g., Chenier, Reproductive
Hazards at 44 (cited in note 95). See also notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
171 DBCP became a cause for concern only after male workers complained of actual
harm: sterility.
1'72 See, e.g., Harold M. Schmeck Jr., Genetic Flaws Can Come from Father, N.Y.
Times sec. IV, p. 20, col. 1 (Feb. 24, 1980) (recent evidence suggests that, although mothers
have been "blamed" for Down's syndrome, 20 to 25 percent of the time the problem may be
due to the father's chromosomes); Naeye and Tafari, Risk Factors at 6-7 (cited in note 71)
(only rarely is evidence of damaged sperm recognized, though such sperm may cause terato-
genesis, i.e., fetal malformation).
173 Consider, e.g., Joan Acker, Issues in the Sociological Study of Women's Work, in
Ann H. Stromberg and Shirley Harkess, eds., Women Working 134, 134 (1978) ("sociology
has been, on the whole, the study of male society"); Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex
xv-xvi, 41, 143-44 (H. M. Parshley trans. 1952).
17 See, e.g., Stellman, Women's Work at 186-87 (cited in note 1), noting that because
women have lower hemoglobin levels than men, some scientists have concluded that women
suffer from a "relative insufficiency of iron"; the perception that women have iron-poor
blood has in turn been used to exclude women from jobs involving lead exposure.
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ple are not excluded from employment on the basis of health risks.
If male (paternal) tolerance levels are considered "normal," poli-
cies imposing disadvantages on men, and giving women an advan-
tage, are unlikely even when appropriate. Thus, evidence of differ-
ential fetal vulnerability is likely to be turned only into a
disadvantage for women and an advantage for men.
Finally, there is the danger of judicial bias.1"5 Commentators
writing in 1977 and 1980 conclude that judges do not always give
serious consideration to women's claims of discrimination.1 7 6 Some
judges have even dismissed such claims with overt hostility to the
female claimants. 77 Judges are both more sympathetic to, and
more likely to redress the injuries of, plaintiffs who claim that an
employer has discriminated on the basis of race. 8 Unless fetal
vulnerability policies are per se impermissible, women are likely to
lose in many courts because their claims of discrimination will not
be given serious consideration.
Consider the history of Olin on remand. As noted earlier, the
Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the trial judge for his deter-
mination of the policy's legality under a "reasonableness" stan-
dard.17 9 On remand, the class representative moved to be dismissed
from the case because she was no longer interested in the job. Her
lawyer also moved for his own dismissal. Olin moved for a hearing
on the merits, and a hearing was scheduled. At the hearing, the
7' See generally Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts i (1986)
("[G]ender bias against women litigants, attorneys, and court employees is a pervasive prob-
lem with grave consequences. Women are often denied equal justice, equal treatment, and
equal opportunity."); The First Year Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force
on Women in the Courts 9 (1984) ("Although the law as written is for the most part gender
neutral, stereotypical myths, beliefs, and biases are found to sometimes affect judicial deci-
sionmaking in the areas investigated.. . . In addition, there is strong evidence that women
and men are sometimes treated differently in courtrooms, in chambers, and at professional
gatherings."); Margaret A. Berger, Litigation on Behalf of Women (1980); Mary C. Dunlap,
The Legal Road to Equal Employment Opportunity- A Critical View, in American Women
Workers in a Full Employment Economy, A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Sub-
comm. on Economic Growth and Stabilization of the Joint Economic Comm. of the Con-
gress of the United States, 95th Con., 1st Sess. 61 (1977) (compendium cited hereafter as
"Women Workers Compendium"); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman: How
Stereotypes About Women Influence Judges, 24 Judges J. 12 (1985); Lynn Hecht Schafran,
Women as Litigators, Trial 37 (Aug. 1983); John D. Johnston and Charles L. Knapp, Sex
Discrimination by Law A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1971).
178 Berger, Litigation at 36-39 (cited in note 175); Dunlap, The Legal Road, in Women
Workers Compendium at 63-70 (cited in note 175).
177 See Berger, Litigation at 38-39; Dunlap, The Legal Road, in Women Workers Com-
pendium at 69-70.
178 Berger, Litigation at 38-39 n.107, 42-43 n.114; Dunlop, The Legal Road, in Women
Workers Compendium at 67-70.
178 See note 135 and accompanying text above.
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class representative and her lawyer were dismissed. The judge then
heard Olin's evidence and entered judgment on the merits against
the class and in favor of Olin. 180 The judge's willingness to enter a
judgment after an ex parte hearing surely suggests that he did not
take seriously claims that the policy discriminated against women.
Because many judges hold stereotypical views of women,"s
they are likely to accept employers' arguments too readily, giving
insufficient attention to the many troubling features that have
been described here at length. For example, when custody is at is-
sue, judges often regard maternal employment as a negative, ex-
pecting "good" mothers to stay home with their children after di-
vorce.' s82 Judges with such attitudes are likely to regard women's
economic reponsibilities as far less important than more tradi-
tional maternal roles.
This concern remains after reading the decisions in Hayes and
Olin. Although neither appellate court upheld the policy before it
on the merits, 83 the standard adopted in these decisions is likely
to be used by other courts to uphold sex-specific policies. In Olin,
the court considered potential children analogous to personal ser-
vice customers: third parties with no interest in maternal employ-
ment. The Hayes court ignored the effects of firing a pregnant
worker. Both held that reasonable policies are permissible because
of employers' desire to avoid fetal injury, without seeing any need
to justify imposing the cost of fetal safety on women and their de-
pendents. The appellate courts did require some evidence of differ-
ential risk associated with maternal exposure, but in both cases
there were serious problems with the scientific evidence ac-
cepted. 84 Neither court seems to have realized that if individual
'80 Telephone interview with Joan E. Bertin, Nov. 6, 1985. The decision is reported as
Wright v. Olin Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1447 (W.D. N.C. 1984). The district court's judgment was
vacated without prejudice to the class only after another appeal to and remand from the
Fourth Circuit. Wright v. Olin Corp., No. 84-1276 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1984).
1'1 See New York Task Force Report at 161-69 (cited in note 175); Schafran, 24 Judges
J. at 13 (cited in note 175).
M This is true even though most women must work after divorce to support their chil-
dren. See New York Task Force Report at 169-71 (cited in note 175); Schafran, 24 Judges J.
at 14-15 (cited in note 175).
183 See note 135 and accompanying text above.
18, In Hayes, 726 F.2d at 155, the court thought that it was adopting an authoritative
scientific standard for x-ray exposure of pregnant women. Actually, the standard was based
on policy judgments, not just scientific evidence. See Appendix text at note 214 below. In
addition, the court misunderstood the standard and actually adopted a more restrictive one.
See Appendix text at notes 207-09 below. And the court adopted the standard without any
appreciation of the weakness of the scientific evidence of fetal risk at current exposure
levels. See Appendix at notes 210-13 below.
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employers are permitted to adopt sex-specific fetal vulnerability
policies, such policies will be adopted only when women were per-
ceived as marginal workers. Neither court considered the possibil-
ity that women might be competent decision makers.8 5
In first amendment law, nondiscretionary standards have been
crafted with an eye to the need to protect against judicial bias.'86
Given the danger of judicial bias when women challenge sex-spe-
cific fetal vulnerability policies, a nondiscretionary standard is ap-
propriate here, too.
In light of the many problems associated with even the most
"reasonable" sex-specific policy adopted by an em-
ployer-problems that cannot be solved by judicial review of em-
ployer decisions-Title VII's BFOQ defense should not be ex-
tended to permit sex-specific policies. Under Title VII, employers
should not be able to respond to evidence of fetal vulnerability by
adopting one set of exposure limits for fertile men and another for
fertile or pregnant women.
Employers are, however, free to respond with policies that do
not discriminate on the basis of sex. Employers can hire sterile
women and men to ensure fetal safety. Employers can and
should811 give all employees and applicants information about re-
productive hazards for both men and women in the same form.88
In Olin, the district court ruled in favor of Olin after a hearing at which only Olin was
represented. See text at note 180 above. The court relied on the "considerable body of opin-
ion" supporting Olin's policy, though there was no evidence indicating that paternal risks
were lower than maternal risks. The court nevertheless ruled for Olin because "Olin should
not be required to allow women employees at a known risk to stay on the restricted jobs
until there is scientific evidence compiled with respect to men." Olin, 585 F. Supp. at 1453
(on remand). Studies of reproductive hazards have, however, focused almost exclusively on
maternal exposure. Nisbet and Karch, Chemical Hazards at 14, 22 (cited in note 71). The
district court's approach gives women very little protection.
"5 In a footnote, the Olin court did indicate that a woman's right (under Title VII) to
choose a job even when risky does not include "a right to make the same choices on behalf
of her unborn children." 697 F.2d at 1189 n.25.
188 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 107-15 (1980) (first amendment doc-
trine should take into account, and guard against, judicial bias).
181 Such warnings are required by existing regulations. See note 105 above.
18 At Olin, women are given written information about reproductive hazards associ-
ated with controlled jobs (controlled jobs are described in note 41 above) and men are given
oral information. This difference in treatment is not merely a formal violation of Title VII.
Written information can more easily be shared with one's spouse. And male workers should
be as able to share information with their wives as female workers are able to share informa-
tion with their husbands. In addition, when men are given information orally about repro-
ductive risks and women are given such information in writing, there is an implicit message
that (regardless of the content of the messages) risks associated with maternal employment
are more serious than risks associated with paternal employment. Perhaps the risks of ma-
ternal employment are more serious; if so, the information about reproductive risks should
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In addition, employers should be able to offer appropriate op-
tions 15 9 to men and women interested in becoming parents and
worried about fetal safety. 90 If only women face reproductive
hazards, special options available only to women before or during
pregnancy also should be permissible as forms of affirmative
action.' 91
III. CONGRESS AS DECISION MAKER
Given the current lack of any firm evidence of differential
risks to fetal safety from maternal and paternal exposure to haz-
ardous substances, employment decisions should be left in
women's hands. If in the future, additional evidence identifies
some substance that causes a significantly higher risk to fetal
safety as a result of maternal exposure, regulation still probably
will be unnecessary. As long as women are given information about
the risks, I think it is unlikely that they will take unreasonable
risks. If evidence ever reveals that maternal exposure causes signif-
icantly greater risks to fetal safety than paternal exposure, and sig-
nificant numbers of women who are likely to have children never-
theless take such jobs, some might consider regulation appropriate.
so state.
189 An employer could, for example, offer optional procedures or safety equipment to
ensure fetal safety to female and male employees interested in becoming parents in the
future. The optional procedure or equipment for pregnant women might be different from
the optional procedure or equipment for men. Or an employer could offer female and male
employees the option of transferring to another job for various periods to ensure fetal
safety.
ISO If women and men facing similar risks are given similar options, any difference in
options and their availability should be regarded as the only way to treat equally beings who
are not, after all, entirely identical with respect to the issue at hand. Slightly different sets
of options do not turn a difference between women and men into an disadvantage for
women and an advantage for men. Rather, the different options accommodate real differ-
ences, promoting actual equality for women and men trying to combine wage work and fam-
ily life.
191 Title VII allows affirmative action programs under some circumstances to compen-
sate members of "minority" groups for systematic disadvantages associated with their mem-
bership in the group. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019
(1986) (court-ordered race-conscious program); Weber, 443 U.S. at 193 (private employer's
program). Special options for fertile or pregnant women should be permissible as forms of
affirmative action, compensating women for the special problems they face because they
bear children, and as permissible though the employer provides no similar options for men,
provided that men face no similar problems. This is a little different, of course, from the
form of affirmative action upheld in Weber (i.e., racial affirmative action offsetting historical
discrimination). However, women will be fully integrated into the mainstream of American
economic life only if it is possible for them to combine work and reproduction. And women
face problems not shared by men in trying to combine these activities. See Herma Hill Kay,
Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 Berkeley Women's L. J. 1 (1985).
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But such regulation should come from Congress, not employers.
Congress would be a better decision maker than employers
and courts for a number of reasons.192 First, Congress would have
no direct financial stake in the issue; its decision on whether to
exclude would be less likely to turn entirely on whether women
were marginal workers in the job in question. Second, although
members of Congress might share many of the problems employers
and courts have in regarding women's interests as distinct from
those of their children,19 members of Congress would be subject to
political pressure from women who can vote. Women's interests
would not be ignored entirely. Third, congressionally mandated
protection policies would not necessarily shift the costs of fetal
safety only to women and their dependents. In the political arena,
women could demand and might receive some form of compensa-
tion for the costs imposed on them when their employment oppor-
tunities are limited for the safety of others.
If exclusion of all fertile women from some jobs proves to be
appropriate, 94 direct or indirect compensation 95 should be given
for the loss caused by exclusion.19 6 Women and their dependents
are disproportionately poor. 9 7 The cost of protecting the health of
one group should not be placed entirely on another group in no
position to bear it.
Similarly, if exclusion of pregnant women proves appropriate,
192 Whether at the present time, any regulatory agency (EPA, OSHA, NRC) has the
authority to promulgate sex-specific regulations is not clear. NRC has published for com-
ments a proposed regulation that discriminates on the basis of sex. See Appendix at note
205 below. And EPA has issued an unpublished "regulation" of a pesticide which requires
that the manufacturer put on the label a warning that it should not be used by fertile
women. See note 163 and accompanying text above.
If Title VII does ban all sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies, federal agencies are
acting illegally in promulgating sex-specific regulations affecting employment opportunities.
Congress has not, to date, authorized any agency to require (or allow) employers to violate
Title VII.
193 See note 63 above.
I" Perhaps routine pregnancy testing should be used as an alternative option to allow
fertile women to work at jobs involving exposure to rapidly eliminated chemicals. See notes
74-75 and accompanying text above. But this question should not be resolved in the ab-
stract, without -any information about the error rate when fertile women are informed of
fetal risks and try to time pregnancies to avoid fetal injury. The little information available
today suggests that women may be fairly successful at timing pregnancies to avoid fetal
injury. See note 106 above.
195 1 use "compensation" in a very broad sense, to include any benefit that is given to
women who have been excluded for the safety of others and that is designed (however
roughly) to offset the cost that exclusion imposes on them.
I" If Congress excludes women from jobs without compensating them, the legislation
might be unconstitutional.
197 See note 54 above.
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some form of compensation (including medical insurance) is neces-
sary to compensate the pregnant worker for the limits being im-
posed on her-at a time when she faces high medical bills and in-
creased living expenses-for the sake of her child.19 And
something more than exclusion of pregnant women is necessary to
ensure fetal safety. Fetal safety will be at risk because of exclusion
unless the excluded pregnant worker receives income and medical
insurance from some alternative source.
Although Congress is unlikely to have the time or interest nec-
essary to regulate substance by substance, it could delegate to an
agency the power to promulgate regulations excluding fertile or
pregnant women from certain jobs if specified standards, for both
exclusion and compensation, were met. The agency could be given
the authority to promulgate cross-industry standards, protecting
fetal safety whenever a certain level of risk exists. The agency
could also be instructed to compensate women for the costs associ-
ated with exclusion in one of several (perhaps alternative) ways.
For example, the agency could be instructed to require employers
excluding fertile women from certain jobs to give women a prefer-
ence, analogous to veterans' preferences, for an equal number of
other jobs with equivalent pay and potential, preferably in the
same locale. Or the agency could be authorized to give women such
a preference itself, in either the private or the public sector.
If restrictions on the employment of pregnant women are ap-
propriate, Congress could direct the agency to protect these espe-
cially vulnerable workers and their potential children by ensuring
that the women are not simply fired with consequent loss of both
pay and medical coverage. The agency could require that state
workers' compensation systems treat pregnancy as a disability in
such instances and provide both disability pay and medical cover-
age. The agency could also require that employers give leaves to
pregnant workers for this period of disability. Or it could require
that employers transfer pregnant women facing specified fetal
hazards to other jobs during pregnancy, with no loss of pay or sen-
iority and with the right to return to their former jobs after
childbirth.
111 I do not mean to suggest that the pregnant worker and her child have no interests
in common. The pregnant worker is likely to be quite interested in fetal safety. She may,
however, have other interests, such as supporting herself and her other children, paying her
medical bills, and continuing her career. Despite these interests, she might gladly limit her
own opportunities for the sake of her unborn child. But one cannot assume that externally
imposed limits, designed to protect the unborn child, are in her interest.
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It may be that the costs of ensuring fetal safety in some indus-
tries are much higher than in other industries, even for the same
substance. Congress could authorize the agency, in this event, to
promulgate industry-specific standards for exclusion and
compensation.
Congress could also protect fetal safety by directly authorizing
employers to exclude on the basis of fetal hazards, provided that
employers met specified exclusion and compensation standards.
For example, an individual employer could be allowed to exclude
fertile or pregnant women provided it could show the level of dif-
ferential vulnerability by sex required by the statute and provided
it also compensated the excluded women according to the statutory
standard, perhaps in some of the ways suggested above. Like Title
VII, such a scheme could be enforced by the EEOC and private
litigants.
By enacting or authorizing fetal vulnerability policies such as
those described above, Congress could protect fetal health without
turning the difference between the risks associated with maternal
and paternal employment into an advantage for men and a disad-
vantage for women.1"' And, to the extent compensation was effec-
tive, the costs of fetal safety would not be borne entirely by women
and their dependents, as is necessarily the case today with sex-spe-
cific policies instituted by employers.
Federal regulation would, however, be costly and perhaps inef-
fective. At both the agency and the congressional level, various in-
terest groups might try to use the regulatory system to achieve
purposes other than those described above. It might be difficult for
Congress to ensure effective regulation in terms of either prevent-
ing the unreasonable exclusion of women or adequately compensat-
ing them.200
Given the problems and costs associated with regula-
tion-including the possibility of congressional insensitivity to
women's independent interests-regulation should be considered
only if there is firm evidence that significant numbers of children
are likely to be born with birth defects as a result of maternal oc-
199 As Catharine MacKinnon has noted, rational discrimination is often unjust, turning
a difference between men and women into an advantage for men and a disadvantage for
women, thereby supporting "a system of second-class status for half of humanity." MacKin-
non, Sexual Harassment at 105 (cited in note 160). See generally id. at 103-41.
200 See, e.g., Ann P. Bartel and Lacy Glenn Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of
Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact, 28 J. L. & Econ. 1, 3, 25 (1985) (suggesting that
interest groups supported OSHA because it effectively, though indirectly, transfers wealth
to large unionized firms).
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cupational exposure, though their mothers were informed of the
risks. In the immediate future, the problem of fetal vulnerability
because of maternal occupational exposure should be handled by
two simple rules: full disclosure of reproductive risks to working
women and men, and no discrimination in employment on the ba-
sis of pregnancy or potential pregnancy. 0 1
CONCLUSION
The arguments supporting sex-specific fetal vulnerability poli-
cies have much in common with the arguments that supported sex-
specific protectionist legislation around the turn of the century. In
light of the troubling assumptions about women's roles and respon-
sibilities that underlie proponents' arguments, even reasonable re-
strictions on the employment of women to protect potential off-
spring should not be casually accepted. Sex-specific policies, no
matter how reasonable, discriminate on the basis of pregnancy or
sex, turning a difference between women and men into a disadvan-
tage for women and an advantage for men. Title VII, as amended
by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of both pregnancy and sex, unless the BFOQ de-
fense is extended to include concern for fetal safety. Such an ex-
tension would, however, be inconsistent with the language of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which mandates that women,
whether pregnant or potentially pregnant, are to be treated like
others similar in ability to do the job.
Extension of the BFOQ defense to recognize concern for fetal
safety is inappropriate on policy grounds. There are four possible
groups of decision makers: Congress, women, courts, and employ-
ers. Employers are not the best decision makers even with judicial
review of their decisions for reasonableness. As long as employers
can decide whether fetal safety should be protected, it will be pro-
tected only when women are regarded as marginal workers, which
is precisely when employment is likely to offer unusual benefits to
the woman and her living and potential children. In addition,
judges may accept too readily a policy as reasonable. And there is a
substantial risk that even the most "reasonable" policy would not
have been adopted were the question one of excluding men on the
basis of heightened fetal risk associated with paternal exposure.
Given the lack of any firm evidence of heightened fetal risk
" In addition, changes to workers' compensation systems should be considered, as
suggested in text at note 123.
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associated with maternal exposure, women should be regarded as
competent decision makers. If there ever is firm evidence of the
need for sex-specific policies, and women who are likely to have
more children nevertheless accept dangerous jobs, Congress would
be a better decision maker than employers. Congress could estab-
lish standards for exclusion and compensation of excluded women,
so that the costs of fetal safety are not borne entirely by women
and their dependents, one of the poorest groups in our society.
Fetal Vulnerability Policies
APPENDIX
The Use of Scientific Evidence
in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital20
2
Shelby Memorial Hospital fired Hayes when she became preg-
nant because its medical director considered any exposure of a
pregnant woman to ionizing radiation excessive."' The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the firing violated Title
VII only because Hayes's exposure during pregnancy would have
been less than the 0.5 rem limit for fetal workplace exposure rec-
ommended by the National Council on Radiation Protection
(NCRP), a congressionally chartered advisory group on radiation
issues.0 4 The general standard for occupational exposure of radia-
tion workers in the United States is 5 rem per year under Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations.0 5
There are three problems with the court's use of the appar-
ently scientific and "authoritative"2 °0 NCRP standard for occupa-
21 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
203 See notes 56-57 and accompanying text above.
2" The NCRP is a nonprofit corporation chartered by Congress in 1964. Among other
duties, the NCRP is to "[d]evelop basic concepts about radiation quantities, units, and
measurements, about the application of these concepts, and about radiation protection."
Radiation Dose Report at 32 (cited in note 79). The NCRP standard for occupational expo-
sure of employees in general is 5 rem per year, which is the same as NRC's general standard.
See id. at 3.
205 10 C.F.R. § 20.101(a) (1985) (for exposure of the whole body, the maximum allowa-
ble dose is 1.25 rem per calendar quarter; higher doses are permitted in some instances
when the entire body is not exposed).
To date, NRC regulations set no special exposure limit for pregnant women. Employers
are to inform women of the hazards associated with exposure during pregnancy and allow
women to decide whether to continue to work. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nu-
clear Regulatory Guide § 8.13 (1975). All workers are to be notified of such hazards. 10
C.F.R. § 19.12 (1980). The NRC has, however, published proposed regulations that would
limit occupational exposure of "declared" pregnant workers so that exposure of the fetus
will not exceed 0.5 rem during pregnancy. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standards for
Protection Against Radiation; Proposed Rule; Extension of Comment Period and Republi-
cation, 51 Fed. Reg. 1091, 1132-33 (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 20.208), 1110 (1986). "Dec-
laration" of pregnancy is to be made by the pregnant worker on a "voluntary" basis. See id.
at 1110. The Commission "recommends" that "conformance to this limitation should be
achieved without economic penalty or loss of job opportunity and security." Id.
If sex-specific policies are illegal under Title VII, the proposed regulations, if promul-
gated, would not legalize sex-specific policies. See note 192 above. If sex-specific policies are
illegal, employers concerned about the safety of pregnant workers' children could offer preg-
nant workers options such as temporary transfers to jobs with lower exposure, as suggested
at notes 189-91 and accompanying text above. Mandatory sex-specific policies would, how-
ever, violate Title VII.
'06 726 F.2d at 1551.
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tional exposure during pregnancy. First, the court misunderstood
the NCRP standard and adopted a more restrictive limit than the
NCRP's. The NCRP 0.5 rem standard refers to the level of expo-
sure of the fetus, not the worker. The NCRP itself notes that for
radiations of low penetrating power, the exposure to the fetus in
utero would be within the 0.5 rem limit were the mother exposed
to 5 rem (annual rate) at a fairly uniform rate.20 7 For x-rays with
high penetrating power,20 8 the mother could be exposed to 1.5 rem,
and fetal exposure would fall within the 0.5 rem limit.20 9
The second problem is the lack of any sound scientific basis
for the NCRP's 0.5 rem standard.210 The NCRP explains that
"[t]he specific choice of 0.5 rem . . . was arbitrary. ' 21' There is
evidence of fetal damage at high levels of exposure to ionizing radi-
ation. But as the NCRP explains: "To date, experimental attempts
to increase cancer incidence by small doses of radiation to fetuses
of animals have failed. ' 212 The NCRP reports that in studies of
2'7 Radiation Dose Report at 3 (cited in note 79).
208 See Jeanne M. Stellman and Susan M. Daum, Work is Dangerous to Your Health
147 (1973).
209 See Pregnancy Guidelines at 23 (cited in note 61) (noting that as a general guide, it
is safe to assume that fetal exposure is one-third the mother's); NRC Standards, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 1110 (cited in note 205) (noting that under exposure limit of 1.5 rem per year for the
mother, "it is likely that the fetus would receive less than 0.5 rem").
210 In 1977, the NCRP issued a publication affirming its 0.5 rem standard for fetal ex-
posure, which had originally been published in 1971. NCRP, Radiation Dose Report at 26
(cited in note 79); NCRP, Basic Radiation Protection Criteria 92-93 (NCRP Report No. 39,
Jan. 15, 1971). In 1977, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation reported that virtually nothing is known about the risk associated with prenatal
exposure at low dose rates. United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation 7-8 (1977).
More recently, the NRC assessed the scientific evidence of fetal risks associated with
maternal occupational exposure to ionizing radiation as inconclusive:
There is no evidence which unequivocally demonstrates an increased incidence of can-
cers or hereditary effects in humans exposed to radiation at the exposure levels found
in the workplace or in the environs of facilities licensed by the NRC. The observed
incidence rate of fatal cancers, the observed fluctuations in normal incidence rates, and
the relatively low radiation risk make demonstration of any slight increase due to radi-
ation exposure essentially impossible to detect.
NRC Standards, 51 Fed. Reg. at 1101 (cited in note 205) (emphasis added). This same pub-
lication proposes a rule placing a special exposure limit on pregnant workers. Id.
21 Radiation Dose Report at 10 (cited in note 79).
212 Id. at 26. This publication reviews and readopts the standard originally announced,
with little in the way of explanation, in NCRP, Basic Radiation Protection Criteria at 92-93
(cited in note 210).
There are some epidemiological data showing a correlation between maternal exposure
to radiation for medical purposes and, for example, childhood leukemia. Radiation Dose
Report at 22-24 (cited in note 79). But there are selection problems with this data; women
who need such medical treatment during pregnancy are less likely to have healthy children.
The NCRP reports that in studies without such selection problems, no radiation effect has
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rats and mice, significant negative effects have not been observed
at exposure levels of less than 15 rads (for x-rays, a rad is equal to
a rem).213
The third problem is that the apparently scientific NCRP
standard for fetal workplace exposure is based on the nonscientific
and questionable judgment that when a woman becomes pregnant,
"[t]he need to minimize exposure of the embryo and fetus is para-
mount. ' 214 This is a value judgment; it cannot support a scientific
standard. The subjectivity implicit in the NCRP's standard for
workplace exposure of pregnant women is evident when this stan-
dard is compared to the NCRP's standard for medical exposure of
pregnant women. In the latter case, the NCRP does not rank mini-
mizing fetal exposure as "paramount" and, as a result, is more tol-
erant of fetal exposure.
In discussing the risks associated with maternal medical expo-
sure, the NCRP states that even a single dose of 10 rads (10 rem
for x-rays) at any stage of pregnancy creates only "a very small"
increase in the normal risks of pregnancy.215 The NCRP concludes
that the risk is "negligible at 5 rad or less when compared to the
other risks of pregnancy, and the risk of malformations is signifi-
cantly increased above control levels only at doses above 15
rad.' ' 21" Because most medical radiographic examinations (other
than fluoroscopy) should expose the fetus to radiation of less than
been shown. Id. at 26; NCRP, Medical Radiation Exposure of Pregnant and Potentially
Pregnant Women 4 (NCRP Report No. 54, July 15, 1977).
183 NCRP, Medical Radiation Exposure at 54 (cited in note 212). These studies typi-
cally involve large single doses. The chance of damage from ionizing radiation is higher for a
single dose of any amount than when that same exposure is spread over time in lower doses.
A pregnant worker exposed to 5 rem per year is most unlikely to receive a single dose of 5
rem. Thus, even where there is evidence of fetal damage in animal studies as a result of
single-dose exposure to 5 rem, such studies would be of limited relevance regarding the risk
associated with a cumulative annual exposure of 5 rem at lower doses. Further, even if there
were some evidence of fetal damage in animals, the correlation between negative effects with
animals and with humans is unknown.
"Rem" measures biologic effect whereas "rad" measures radiation energy absorbed per
gram. Biologic effect varies with penetrating power of the radiation absorbed; the lower the
penetrating power, the greater the biological damage to the tissues reached by the radiation.
See Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, Division of Medical Sci-
ences, Assembly of Life Sciences, National Research Council, The Effects on Populations of
Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: 1980, 13-14 (1980). "Reins are defined as a
factor Q times rads, where Q is set equal to 1 for gamma and X-rays, and 20 for alpha
particles. Thus, at equivalent energy depositions [i.e., rads] the alpha particle will produce
20 times the biological damage of gamma and X-rays." Reproductive Health Hazards at 94
(cited in note 35).
,14 NCRP, Basic Radiation Protection Criteria at 92 (cited in note 210).
815 NCRP, Medical Radiation Exposure at 10 (cited in note 212).
214 Id. at 11.
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1 rad (1 rem for x-rays), the NCRP advises that "the probability of
detectable effect induced by such exposures is so small as to be
outweighed by any significant medical benefit. ' 217 In contrast, as
noted earlier, the NCRP recommends that cumulative218 fetal
workplace exposure not exceed 0.5 rem.
The NCRP justifies the lower occupational limit for fetal ex-
posure on the ground that the fetus has no choice but to accom-
pany its mother to work; it should therefore be exposed to a maxi-
mum dose of 0.5 rem, which is the standard for the general
population (in contrast to the occupational standard of 5 rem).
The NCRP explains that medical treatment is different because
the fetus of the pregnant client is a potential beneficiary of the
medical examination.219
Thus, the NCRP's 0.5 rem fetal workplace limit is based on
questionable perceptions, attitudes, and values. In setting this
217 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). See also Harold M. Schwartz, Hazards of Radiation Ex-
posure for Pregnant Women, 239 J. Amer. Med. Assoc. 1907 (1978) (reaching similar conclu-
sions on risks associated with exposure for medical purposes). Compare NCRP, Basic Radia-
tion Protection Criteria at 14 (cited in note 210), where in determining that occupational
exposure should not be limited for workers also exposed to radiation for medical purposes,
the NCRP reasons: "The disruption of a person's way of life by denying him his job may be
more damaging than the addition of a few reins per year to a necessary major medical
exposure."
218 Although scientists do not know the precise shape of the dose-response curve for
ionizing radiation at low exposure levels, there is a consensus that lower doses are probably
safer than higher doses even if there is no difference in total cumulative exposure. See, e.g.,
NCRP, Medical Radiation Exposure at 6 (cited in note 212); NRC Standards, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 1101 (cited in note 205).
219 NCRP, Medical Radiation Exposure at 3. The NCRP also justifies the 0.5 rem stan-
dard by presenting a worst-case hypothesis of the risks to the fetus of maternal exposure at
the 5 rem level. The NCRP assumes that the dose-response curve is linear at the lowest
levels of exposure, and extrapolates from epidemiological and experimental data at higher
levels. Under these assumptions, and on the basis of a number of other guesses-for exam-
ple, that there are 100,000 fertile women occupationally exposed to ionizing radiation and
that 7,000 of them are pregnant each year-the NCRP concludes that exposure of the entire
relevant female work force would result in 35 cases per year with serious effects. Without
occupational exposure, for that number of pregnancies, there would be 287 cases per year of
equivalent malformations and cancers from natural causes. Thus, there would be a relative
risk of serious congenital malformations or early cancers of 1.12 for these workers relative to
the background risks (a 12 percent greater chance of cancer or serious malformation). Radi-
ation Dose Report at 5-7 (cited in note 79). Whether this risk is excessive is not susceptible
to answer by the scientific method.
In addition, the worst-case scenario is a worse than worst-case scenario. In its publica-
tion on medical exposure of pregnant clients, the NCRP explains that a straight-line dose
effect is unlikely given actual findings and theoretical considerations. NCRP, Medical Radi-
ation Exposure at 6 (cited in note 212). Further, the NCRP assumes that every pregnant
worker would be exposed to 5 rem in the absence of a special limit on exposure of pregnant
workers, though as of 1986, the average exposure of United States radiation workers is
under 0.5 rem per year. NRC Standards, 51 Fed. Reg. at 1103 (cited in note 205).
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limit, the NCRP looked only at the risks associated with fetal
workplace exposure and ignored the disadvantages of exclusion to
both the pregnant worker and her unborn child. The NCRP did
not see women as individuals with independent interests warrant-
ing any consideration in the risk-benefit calculus, and it perceived
women's maternal responsibilities as biologic, ignoring their eco-
nomic responsibilities.
As noted earlier in the main body of this article, one reason
for holding that all sex-specific fetal vulnerability policies violate
Title VII is that courts are likely to have difficulty evaluating sci-
entific evidence. In Hayes, the court tried to adopt a standard it
thought was scientific and therefore "authoritative," but it actually
adopted a more restrictive limit because it misunderstood the stan-
dard itself. In addition, the court accepted a standard recom-
mended by scientists and experts without any appreciation of how
little evidence there really was of fetal risks when pregnant work-
ers are occupationally exposed to 5 rem or less per year (the gen-
eral worker limit in the United States) or of the nonscientific judg-
ments implicit in the "scientific" standard.
Scientists might be able to tell us facts about the risks associ-
ated with occupational hazards-though they do not yet have
much factual information about the reproductive risks associated
with maternal or paternal occupational exposure. But the scientific
method cannot identify the "reasonable" level of fetal risk for oc-
cupational exposure of pregnant or fertile women. That will always
be a value-laden judgment. Such value judgments are, however,
easily obscured when scientists purport to identify appropriate ex-
posure limits on the basis of scientific evidence. It is difficult for a
layperson to break through the scientific jargon to identify the
points at which nonscientific judgments are being made.
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